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strike on the protesters. The reason for this uncontroversial rule is simple—not every
riot or civil disturbance should be treated like a war.
But what if President Obama had invited Canada to bomb the protestors—once
the United States consented, would all bets be off ? Can an intervening state use force
that would be illegal for the host state to use itself ? The silence on this issue is
dangerous, in no small part because these once-rare conflicts are now commonplace.
States are increasingly using force against organized non-state actors outside of the
states’ own territories—usually, though not always, with the consent of the host state.
What constrains the scope of the host state’s consent? And can the intervening state
always presume that consent is valid?
This Article argues that a host state’s authority to consent is limited and that
intervening states cannot treat consent as a blank check. Accordingly, even in
consent-based interventions, the logic and foundational norms of the international legal
order require both consent-giving and consent-receiving states to independently
evaluate what legal regime governs—this will often turn on whether the intensity
threshold has been met. If a non-international armed conflict exists, the actions of the
intervening state are governed by international humanitarian law; if not, its actions
are governed instead by its own and the host state’s human rights obligations.
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INTRODUCTION
On the afternoon of January 2, 2016, a group of activists occupied the
headquarters of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, a facility managed by the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service that had been left empty for the holiday weekend.1
The armed activists,2 led by brothers Ammon and Ryan Bundy, announced that
“they had as many as 100 supporters with them.”3 Ammon Bundy indicated that
the group “plann[ed] on staying [at the Refuge] for years,” and its members would
be willing to fight and die for its cause.4 While the Oregon occupiers cited local
concerns, they also questioned the authority of the federal government on myriad
issues.5 And they are not alone: there are over 200 armed militia groups in the
United States, many of them with similar antigovernment views.6
1 Liam Stack, Wildlife Refuge Occupied in Protest of Oregon Ranchers’ Prison Terms, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/03/us/oregon-ranchers-will-return-to-prison-angeringfar-right-activists.html [https://perma.cc/3APG-RAWT].
2 Id.
3 Les Zaitz, Militia Takes Over Malheur National Wildlife Refuge Headquarters, OREGONIAN (Jan. 2, 2016),
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2016/01/drama_in_burns_ends_with_quiet.html
[https://perma.cc/PU52-H92U].
4 Id.
5 See Judy L. Thomas, Experts: Oregon Standoff May Be Small, but It’s Just the Tip of a Growing Militia
Iceberg, KAN. CITY STAR (Jan. 6, 2016, 3:29 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/government-politics/
article53351000.html [https://perma.cc/K786-HRYC] (discussing militants’ demands for the government
to cede control of the Refuge to ranchers, outcry against a judicial ruling that some ranchers serve out their
prison sentences, and opposition to gun control laws).
6 Id.; see also Antigovernment Militia Groups Grew by More than One-Third in Last Year, S. POVERTY L.
CTR. (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2016/01/04/antigovernment-militia-groups-grew-more-
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Although the Oregon events may seem far removed from the concerns of
international law, they help illustrate a potential loophole in international
humanitarian law. An international armed conflict commences as soon as one
state uses military force against another. But conflicts between states and
organized non-state actors are different. Such conflicts must meet a minimum
intensity threshold before they become non-international armed conflicts
(NIACs), as opposed to riots or civil disturbances. And, until a NIAC is
established, a state’s actions are governed by its domestic laws and human
rights obligations, rather than international humanitarian law. The threshold
requirement may appear to be a mere technicality, but it is vitally important:
without it, the rhetoric of the Oregon occupiers, the rise of associated militias,
and the growing threat of domestic terror might have been enough for the
U.S. government to conclude that it was in a NIAC with the organized militia
group and employ military force in response.
The intensity threshold for establishing the existence of a NIAC is wellestablished and uncontroversial; clearly, not every riot or civil disturbance should
be treated like a war. But what if the state in which the organized non-state actor
is located invites another state to intervene? Are all bets off? Can the intervening
state use force that would be illegal for the host state to use itself? Thus far,
international lawyers have not adequately confronted this dilemma.7 The
silence is dangerous, as it leaves a potential loophole that states may use to
avoid legal rules that constrain the use of violence by states against organized
non-state actors.
The idea that President Obama might have invited Canada to use military
force against the Oregon occupiers may seem ludicrous, but the legal dilemma
the scenario poses is not simply academic. States are increasingly inviting or
consenting to the use of force by outside states against organized non-state
actors in their territories.
One of the most notable recent cases is in Syria: In September 2015, Russia
began conducting air strikes against various non-state actor groups at the
request of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.8 Kremlin Chief of Staff Sergey
Ivanov emphasized that Russia had received consent for the intervention,
stating that Assad had “turned to [Russia’s] leadership, requesting military
assistance.”9 Russia initially claimed to be targeting only the Islamic State
one-third-last-year [https://perma.cc/F4XQ-EXNN] (identifying 276 militia groups, typically with “extreme
antigovernment doctrines” and conspiracy theory beliefs).
7 The best work to date is Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy,
54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2013), but it focuses more broadly on international consent to the use of force.
8 Russia Carries Out First Air Strikes in Syria, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2015/09/russian-carries-air-strikes-syria-150930133155190.html [https://perma.cc/Q32Z-UA2T].
9 Lawmakers Authorize Use of Russian Military Force for Anti-IS Airstrikes in Syria, TASS (Sept. 30,
2015, 10:54 AM) (alteration in original), http://tass.ru/en/politics/824795 [https://perma.cc/83R4-XLLT].
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(sometimes also referred to as ISIS), but later explained that it would target
“all terrorists” in the country.10 The United States and the European Union,
along with representatives of the Syrian rebels, alleged that Russia’s true targets
were antigovernment opposition groups.11 As of mid-2016, Russian strikes had
reportedly killed over two thousand civilians.12
Or consider the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) intervention in
Bahrain. In mid-February 2011, protesters began occupying Pearl Square in
the Bahraini capital of Manama.13 On March 14, 2011, roughly 1500 troops—
approximately 1000 from Saudi Arabia and another 500 from the United
Arab Emirates14—entered Bahrain at the invitation of the Bahraini
government.15 Bahrain’s King Hamad declared a state of emergency on May
15, and security forces forcibly cleared the square the following day.16 At least
six people died in the March 16 crackdown,17 and at least thirty civilian
deaths have occurred in total.18 The Bahrain Independent Commission of
Inquiry found that many of these deaths “resulted from the use of excessive
and unnecessary lethal force.”19
In the Mediterranean Sea, the European Union continues to conduct
“Operation Sophia,” a naval operation intended to combat people-smugglers

10 Russia Joins War in Syria: Five Key Points, BBC (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-34416519 [https://perma.cc/4GVY-7NWJ].
11 Anne Barnard, Syrian Rebels Say Russia Is Targeting Them Rather than ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/middleeast/syrian-rebels-say-russia-targets-themrather-than-isis.html [https://perma.cc/6369-SU23]; Russia Joins War in Syria: Five Key Points, supra
note 10; Syria Conflict: Putin Defends Russia’s Air Strikes, BBC (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-34502286 [https://perma.cc/GTU5-HC62].
12 Emma Graham-Harrison, Russian Airstrikes in Syria Killed 2,000 Civilians in Six Months,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2016, 2:28 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/15/russian-airstrikes-insyria-killed-2000-civilians-in-six-months [https://perma.cc/2MB6-H5HA]; About 1100 Children and Women
Between 2766 Civilians Killed by Russian Airstrikes During 10 Months, SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUM.
RTS. (July 30, 2016), http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=48923 [https://perma.cc/B74V-X73U].
13 INT’L CRISIS GRP., POPULAR PROTESTS IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (III):
THE BAHRAIN REVOLT 8 (2011), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/105-popular-protests-in-northafrica-and-the-middle-east-iii-the-bahrain-revolt.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5P4-SMB8].
14 Ethan Bronner & Michael Slackman, Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Help Put Down Unrest,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15bahrain.html
[https://perma.cc/QKB5-B4PF].
15 Kelly McEvers, Bahrain: The Revolution That Wasn’t, NPR (Jan. 5, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.
npr.org/2012/01/05/144637499/bahrain-the-revolution-that-wasnt [https://perma.cc/AR2C-SK5H].
16 Curfew Follows Deadly Bahrain Crackdown, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2011/03/201131643831976772.html [https://perma.cc/3V3L-RLUF].
17 Id.
18 Arab Uprising: Country by Country - Bahrain, BBC (Dec. 16, 2013, 3:28 PM), http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-12482295 [https://perma.cc/QL3M-NUQH].
19 MAHMOUD CHERIF BASSIOUNI ET AL., BAHR. INDEP. COMM’N OF INQUIRY, REPORT
OF THE BAHRAIN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 223 (2011), http://www.bici.org.bh/
BICIreportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/B79X-7G7K].
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off the Libyan coast.20 In addition to interdiction efforts, the operation also
includes training for the Libyan Coast Guard.21 But, as of September 2016,
all anti-smuggling operations and training must take place on the high seas
because the Libyan government has not yet granted permission for EU
forces to enter its territorial waters.22 If the European Union eventually
secures Libya’s consent—which has been anticipated for months—it will be
deploying military forces to conduct what are essentially police actions
inside Libya’s borders.23
The rise of interventions by consent is due in part to the fact that
organized armed non-state actors are gaining power globally. In addition to
al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their affiliates across the globe, there are also
drug cartels in Latin America, the Free Papua Movement in Indonesia, the
Kurdistan Freedom Party in Iran, the FARC in Colombia, and countless
others.24 Many of these non-state groups are in armed conflicts with both their
host states and extraterritorial states. In fact, conflicts between non-state actors
and extraterritorial states have become so common that they now have their own
label: “Transnational Non-International Armed Conflicts,” or TNIACs for short.
Does the intensity threshold requirement for establishing a NIAC still
apply to these conflicts? The answer, this Article concludes, is yes. Host state
consent solves the jus ad bellum concern for the intervening state, insofar as it
makes permissible what would otherwise be an unlawful violation of the host
state’s sovereignty. But host state consent does not require that an armed
conflict exists, a distinct analysis that will often turn on whether the intensity
threshold has been reached.
We argue that the logic and foundational norms of the international legal
order require the intervening state to independently evaluate whether a
NIAC exists between the host state and the organized non-state actor. Host
states violate international law by consenting to actions that their own human
rights obligations or domestic laws would prevent them from taking themselves.
The corollary principle holds that intervening states cannot rely on host state
consent to provide the legal basis for their use of force if that consent is a manifest
violation of international human rights law. If a non-international armed conflict
exists, the host state could act pursuant to international humanitarian law, and
20 Laurence Norman & Valentina Pop, EU to Help Libya Fight Smugglers with Naval Mission,
WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2016, 12:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-to-help-libya-fight-smugglerswith-naval-mission-1464020730 [https://perma.cc/6XXM-NFTK].
21 Chris Stephen, British Warship Sent to Libya to Target People-Smugglers, GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2016,
7:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/03/uk-warship-to-tackle-libya-people-smugglers
[https://perma.cc/UYQ4-EE3Z].
22 Id.
23 Norman & Pop, supra note 20.
24 For a partial list of over one hundred armed non-state actors, see Armed Non-State Actors, GENEVA
CALL, http://www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/armed-non-state-actors [https://perma.cc/6YNZ-ZRLD].
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thus the intervening state may do so as well. If a NIAC does not exist,
however, then the intervening state’s lawful actions are limited by its own and
the host state’s human rights obligations.25
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the logic and purpose
of the requirement that clashes between states and organized non-state actors
must meet a minimum intensity to be treated as armed conflicts. Before a
threat by a non-state actor may be deemed a NIAC, international law requires
a two-pronged test that has become standard across state military manuals,
international jurisprudence, and academic commentary. These entities all rely
on the same formulation: ordinary violence becomes a NIAC when the state
faces a sufficiently organized non-state actor whose violence meets a
particular intensity threshold. Part I explains that this articulation of the rule
traces to Prosecutor v. Tadić, a decision of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).26 But the ICTY did not create the test
out of whole cloth. The test rests on a solid and longstanding foundation in
international treaty and case law, and it is broadly recognized as authoritative
by states, scholars, and practitioners.
Part II explains that, although the test for evaluating whether a NIAC
exists is widely accepted, there is a dangerous potential loophole: Host state
consent to intervention may be treated as a substitute for an analysis of
whether the intensity threshold for a NIAC has been met and armed force
against the non-state actor is appropriate. Indeed, intervening states usually
legitimate their actions by citing either the need to act in self-defense or the
host state’s consent; in short, they focus on clarifying that their actions are
lawful under jus ad bellum. But, absent evidence that the intensity threshold
has been met and a determination that an armed conflict exists, it is not clear
that the use of military force against non-state actors is lawful. Hence, the
exclusive focus on the ad bellum requirements threatens to undermine the
intensity threshold.
Part III highlights the stakes of leaving this loophole open. The intensity
threshold separates instances in which a state may respond to a rising insurgency
with force governed by human rights law and other domestic law applicable in
peacetime from instances in which a state may respond to such an insurgency
with military force governed by international humanitarian law. The consent
loophole would allow intervening states to ignore this distinction. In the Oregon
example, the loophole would allow the Canadian government to carry out a

25 Of course, in either case, the intervening state’s actions will also be limited by the scope of
the host state’s consent.
26 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), http://www.icty.
org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm [https://perma.cc/6JVJ-A6Q6].
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drone strike against the protesters as long as it had U.S. consent, even though
the U.S. government could not itself use military force against the protesters.
Part IV describes how to close the loophole. First, the host state may only
lawfully consent to uses of force against organized non-state actors that it
could itself legally undertake. Second, the intervening state may not rely on
consent manifestly given in violation of international law, which means that
it must independently evaluate whether the host state has the lawful authority
to take the actions to which it has consented. Both states involved must
independently determine whether the intensity threshold for a NIAC has
been met, which in turn triggers the application of international humanitarian
law. Applying the intensity threshold to consent-based interventions in this
way is not only consistent with general principles of international law, this
Part argues, but it is also dictated by principles of common sense.
This Article concludes by showing that applying the intensity threshold
does not prevent states from effectively responding to threats posed by
organized non-state actors. States continue to have access to a wide array of
law enforcement tools with which they can address such threats.
I. THE INTENSITY THRESHOLD
In the 1995 case Prosecutor v. Tadić, the ICTY defined a NIAC as a
situation in which there is “protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
State.”27 This formulation is regularly cited as authoritative in state military
manuals, international legal instruments, international jurisprudence, and
expert and academic commentary.28 It has become such a familiar formulation
for determining whether a NIAC exists that some have suggested it is
customary international law.29
This Part begins by outlining the Tadić test and the intensity threshold it
established. Although the test was famously formulated by the Tadić court in
1995, it was not invented by the court out of thin air. The test is deeply rooted
in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and while the legal implications of satisfying
its threshold have changed over time, the threshold itself has remained constant.

Id. ¶ 70.
See infra subsection I.B.2.
See, e.g., Noëlle Quénivet, Applicability Test of Additional Protocol II and Common Article 3 for
Crimes in Internal Armed Conflict (“This minimum threshold that allows a distinction between armed
conflicts and other situations as well as the factors adopted by the ICTY to ascertain whether a
conflict is taking place—intensity of conflict and organisation of the armed groups—are now widely
accepted by the ICTR, the SCSL and the ICC.”), in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES 31, 57 (Derek Jinks et al. eds., 2014).
27
28
29
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A. The Tadić Test
The Tadić test includes two prongs, each of which must be met to establish
the existence of a NIAC. First, the non-state actor must have a minimum
level of organization.30 At the least, the non-state actor must operate with a
command structure sufficient to enable it to implement obligations under the
two main international humanitarian law instruments governing NIACs:
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions31 and Additional Protocol II
to those Conventions.32
Second, the Tadić test requires “protracted armed violence” for a conflict to
qualify as a NIAC.33 This prong is universally understood as an intensity
requirement or intensity threshold, and it is “used solely for the purpose . . . of
distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived
insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to international
humanitarian law.”34 In subsequent cases, the ICTY articulated factors to help
gauge whether the level of violence is sufficient to meet Tadić’s intensity
threshold. These include the seriousness of the conflict; the increase and spread
of clashes over territory and time; the distribution and type of weapons
employed; the presence of government forces and their use of force; the number
of casualties; the incidence of civilians fleeing from the combat zone; the extent
of destruction; the blocking, besieging, and heavy shelling of towns; the existence
and change of front lines; the occupation of territory; the imposition of road
closures; and the attention of the U.N. Security Council.35 Where an organized
non-state actor engages in conflict with a state, it is this second prong that
determines whether the conflict has become a NIAC.
To the extent academics have evaluated the Tadić formulation, they have
largely focused on the organizational prong. Some argue that states do not pay
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶ 70.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [together hereinafter Common Article 3].
32 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
33 Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶ 70.
34 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 562 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QV5U-BYUE].
35 E.g., Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 177 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/boskoski_tarculovski/tjug/en/080710.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5WDX-VZTZ].
30
31
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sufficient attention to the organizational prong;36 indeed, some suggest that the
U.N. Security Council wrongly ignored it when addressing the Libyan conflict.37
Others have raised concerns about whether the organizational prong has been
applied correctly38 and even whether it remains relevant.39
In contrast, this Article focuses on the intensity prong, which has thus far
received much less attention. Unlike the organizational prong, the intensity
threshold may be conflated—unlawfully and dangerously, we argue—with the
jus ad bellum inquiry.40 The intensity prong is also likely to be decisive in looming
legal challenges, including whether it is appropriate to try Abd al-Rahim al
Nashiri by military commission rather than in federal court.41 In focusing on the
36 See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, The DoJ White Paper’s Fatal International Law Flaw—Organization,
OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 5, 2013, 12:05 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/02/05/the-doj-white-papers-fatalinternational-law-flaw [https://perma.cc/K8ZY-GSLW] (arguing that the United States “completely
ignore[d]” the organization requirement of the Tadić test when justifying targeted killing of “alQa’ida and its associated forces”).
37 LOUISE ARIMATSU & MOHBUBA CHOUDHURY, CHATHAM HOUSE, THE LEGAL
CLASSIFICATION OF THE ARMED CONFLICTS IN SYRIA, YEMEN AND LIBYA 36-39 (2014),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/20
14300ClassificationConflictsArimatsuChoudhury1.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZT4-235D] [hereinafter
CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT].
38 See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank & Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law, and
the Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 693, 726-31 (2013) (criticizing the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry established by the U.N. Human Rights Council
for relying on “an overly technical conception of the conditions triggering” the application of the
law of armed conflict in Syria under Tadić’s framework).
39 See Arne Willy Dahl & Magnus Sandbu, The Threshold of Armed Conflict, 45 MIL. L. & L. WAR
REV. 369, 374 (2006) (stating that the focus on defining armed conflict in terms of “whether the armed
opposition groups are organized and the intensity of the armed violence” is misplaced and arguing that
the focus should instead be “more on how the government behaves and relates to basic human rights”).
40 See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
41 Trial by military commission is an option available under U.S. law only for crimes
committed after the commencement of hostilities. 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c) (2012). Al Nashiri, who is
affiliated with al Qaeda, is accused of complicity in the October 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole
and an earlier attempt on another American warship. See Robert Loeb, Will the Federal Court Address
Whether We Were at War with al Qaeda Prior to 9/11?, LAWFARE (Feb. 19, 2016, 11:30 AM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/will-federal-court-address-whether-we-were-war-al-qaeda-prior-911 [https://
perma.cc/6J2C-GLKL] (discussing oral argument in a D.C. Circuit case challenging a military
commission’s ability to try defendants for crimes that predated the incidents of September 11, 2001);
Peter Margulies, DC Circuit in Al-Nashiri: All Clear for Military Commission Trial, LAWFARE (Aug.
31, 2016, 9:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/dc-circuit-al-nashiri-all-clear-military-commissiontrial [https://perma.cc/EQ46-CRSE] (discussing a divided D.C. Circuit panel’s decision to allow a
military commission to proceed); see also Kevin Jon Heller, No, the Attack on the USS Cole Did Not
Take Place in Armed Conflict, OPINIO JURIS (May 6, 2014, 5:42 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/05/06/attackuss-cole-take-place-armed-conflict [https://perma.cc/WSB9-TZB6] (arguing that there was no NIAC
between the United States and al Qaeda at the time of the U.S.S. Cole bombing); Peter Margulies,
Al-Nashiri, the Cole Bombing, and the Start of the Conflict with Al-Qaeda, LAWFARE (May 6, 2014, 10:00 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/al-nashiri-cole-bombing-and-start-conflict-al-qaeda [https://perma.cc
/K54K-HEXB] (arguing the converse). See generally Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The CMCR’s Latest
(Non)Decision in al-Nashiri [Updated with Links to Supplemental Briefs], JUST SECURITY (July 8, 2016, 8:05
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intensity threshold, we do not mean to dismiss the relevance of the
organizational requirement. Our aim is instead to rebalance the scales by
acknowledging the longstanding importance of the intensity threshold and to
argue for its maintenance and protection in situations where states might prefer
to ignore it.
B. The History of the Intensity Threshold
Tadić is just over two decades old, but the intensity requirement it
articulated is far older. This Section traces the development of the intensity
threshold from its emergence in Common Article 3 to its consolidation in
Tadić and subsequent state practice, international jurisprudence, and
academic commentary. This history confirms that the intensity threshold was
based on principles that have defined the NIAC assessment since the Geneva
Conventions were first adopted.
1. Common Article 3
Historically, states have resisted applying international humanitarian law in
wholly domestic situations. While negotiating the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
states initially opposed proposals for the Conventions to govern domestic
conflicts, including full-fledged civil wars.42 This was in keeping with the
international legal environment at the time. After all, the human rights
revolution, with its focus on the behavior of states within their own
territories, had not yet occurred.43
Given this context, Common Article 3—so called because it is common to all
of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions—was groundbreaking.44 Although it does
not apply to internal unrest, such as sporadic riots or criminal activities,45 it
mandates that “[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to

AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/31888/cmcrs-decision-mv-limburg-charges-al-nashiri [https://perma.cc/
QLC4-8WJK] (discussing the Court of Military Commission Review’s decision regarding al Nashiri).
42 JEAN DE PREUX, COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 37 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960) [hereinafter
PICTET COMMENTARY].
43 See Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1822 (2003) (“Over
the last half-century, the number of treaties that address issues of human rights has grown from a
handful to hundreds.”). The first modern human rights treaty, the U.N. Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, was approved on December 9, 1948 and entered into
force in 1951. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 77 U.N.T.S. 277.
44 Common Article 3, supra note 31.
45 PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 42, at 28-31.
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the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum” certain protections.46 By
imposing obligations on state conduct in internal conflicts, Common Article
3 has justly been described as “a revolutionary inroad into traditional notions
of State sovereignty.”47
Common Article 3’s radical nature necessitated strict constraints—
including the intensity threshold—to alleviate state concerns.48 States were
reluctant to sacrifice elements of their sovereignty by allowing international
law to regulate their internal behavior,49 and states were concerned that
Common Article 3 might tacitly legitimize organized non-state actors as
“[p]art[ies] to [a] conflict,”50 rather than simply illegitimate criminals or
rebels.51 Indeed, prior to the development of the human rights regime,
recognizing non-state actors as parties to a conflict imposed new legal
constraints on state action.52

46 Common Article 3, supra note 31. The International Court of Justice has recognized the
protections of Common Article 3 as customary international law. See Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 218 (June 27)
(explaining that Common Article 3’s rules are “elementary considerations of humanity”).
47 Gabor Rona, Is There a Way Out of the Non-International Armed Conflict Detention Dilemma?,
91 INT’L L. STUD. 32, 36 (2015).
48 The radical nature of Common Article 3 also helps explain the more limited scope of the
obligations it imposes, relative to the much more extensive and developed rules governing
international armed conflicts. See id. (“[International armed conflict] rules are extensive, while
NIAC rules are minimal, reflecting a traditional perspective on sovereignty: States are much more
willing to establish international law rules for their mutual relations—even war—than for their
internal affairs or their relations with non-State entities.”). While states eventually acceded to
Common Article 3 after an extensive lobbying by the International Committee of the Red Cross,
the protections extended to NIACs were far less expansive than those the ICRC initially envisaged.
See PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 42, at 28-35.
49 See Jonathan Horowitz, Transferring Wartime Detainees and a State’s Responsibility to Prevent
Torture, 2 NAT’L SECURITY L. BRIEF 43, 51 n.45 (2012) (“The law of non-international armed
conflict is limited in scope because States wish to protect their sovereignty . . . .”).
50 Common Article 3, supra note 31.
51 See Kenneth Roth, The Human Rights Movement and International Humanitarian Law (“There also
was a concern—much more in the past than these days—about legitimizing rebel groups by addressing
them. The question here was whether the application of [international humanitarian law] to a rebel group
in and of itself constituted a political act, with the effect of raising the stature of the . . . group.”), in
HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PRACTICE TO POLICY 25, 30 (Carrie Booth Walling & Susan Waltz eds., 2011);
Marko Milanovic, Footnote Filching and Other Unsavory Practices in the US Supreme Court, Part III, OPINIO
JURIS (May 2, 2007, 5:51 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2007/05/02/footnote-filching-and-other-unsavorypractices-in-the-us-supreme-court-part-iii [https://perma.cc/Q5YC-WQA4] (“States have always feared
that applying [international humanitarian law] to rebels might somehow legitimize them . . . .”).
52 Even in today’s altered legal order, states often resist classifying their internal struggles as
NIACs—as France did in Algeria, the United Kingdom did in Northern Ireland, and Russia did in
Chechnya—because the “armed conflict” label implicitly legitimates the organized non-state actors’ cause.
Milanovic, supra note 51; see also Katherine Draper, Note, Why a War Without a Name May Need One:
Policy-Based Application of International Humanitarian Law in the Algerian War, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J.
575, 585 (2013) (discussing France’s refusal to characterize its Algerian conflict as an armed conflict).
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States’ reluctance to recognize the existence of a NIAC necessitated a
clear means of distinguishing NIACs from internal disturbances of lesser
severity.53 Accordingly, from its inception, Common Article 3 was understood
to apply only once an internal conflict reached a certain level of intensity.
This understanding was further elaborated in the 1977 Additional Protocol II,
which noted that “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature,”
are not “armed conflicts.”54
2. Supporting State Practice, International Jurisprudence, and Scholarship
Recent state practice suggests that the intensity threshold is still widely
regarded as a mandatory condition for establishing the existence of a NIAC.
Several states’ military manuals routinely cite Tadić and its two prongs as the
prevailing test for when a NIAC exists,55 and states as well as non-governmental
organizations commonly employ it. For example, both the U.S. State Department
and Human Rights Watch identified the same month, May 2011, as the “start
date” for a NIAC in Yemen,56 notwithstanding the fact that the non-state
opposition had appeared to be sufficiently organized and had engaged in some
skirmishes prior to that date. A representative of the NGO Saferworld later
explained in a Chatham House report,
Despite the excessive use of force by government forces against the
demonstrators . . . [, h]uman rights law continued to apply exclusively . . .
primarily because the attacks against the demonstrators, albeit lethal at times,
were sporadic for the most part and because those armed groups that sided
with the pro-democracy protesters appeared to limit their use of force to
defending the demonstrators against attacks rather than proactively engaging

53 Even today, as a legal matter, a state’s subjective classification of strife is irrelevant to determining
whether a NIAC exists; the existence or non-existence of a NIAC depends instead on objective facts. E.g.,
YORAM DINSTEIN, NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2014).
54 Additional Protocol II, supra note 32, art. 1(2). The Second Additional Protocol articulates a
distinct threshold from Common Article 3, as it includes a territorial control component. Id. Nevertheless,
the Second Additional Protocol’s definition of a NIAC builds on Common Article 3, and it is regarded by
many as a clarification of the scope of application of international humanitarian law to such conflicts. See,
e.g., DEREK JINKS, INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW RESEARCH INITIATIVE, THE TEMPORAL SCOPE OF
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS 5 (2003),
http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Session3.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP8M-J8C6]
(noting that Protocol II purports to not modify existing applications of Common Article 3).
55 E.g., MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE, MANUEL DE DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMÉS 34 (2012)
(Fr.); FED. MINISTRY OF DEF., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL 186-87 (2013) (Ger.); UK
MINISTRY OF DEF., THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 384-86 (2004) (U.K.);
OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL OF THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF
WAR MANUAL 1010-13 (2015) (U.S.).
56 CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 28.
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with government loyalists or state forces . . . . The evidence appears to
suggest that it was not until May 2011 that armed clashes between the
defecting units and those that remained loyal to former president Saleh
reached the requisite threshold of intensity to trigger an armed conflict.57

It appears likely that the State Department and Human Rights Watch also
both employed the intensity requirement to identify May as the “start date”
for the NIAC in Yemen.
International legal instruments and international judicial opinions also
support this reading. Tadić has been cited as the prevailing test not just in
subsequent ICTY cases,58 but also by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda,59 the Special Court for Sierra Leone,60 and the International
Criminal Court.61 Indeed, the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court draws on Tadić in defining its jurisdiction over crimes
committed in NIACs.62
Finally, academic and expert commentary recognizes the Tadić test as
authoritative.63 For example, the Tallinn Manual, the result of a NATO-led
Id. at 28-29.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 185 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/boskoski_tarculovski/tjug/en/080710.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5WDX-VZTZ] (reiterating the Tadić test for finding an armed conflict).
59 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 619-21 (Sept. 2, 1998), http://
unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/trial-judgements/en/980902.pdf [https://perma.
cc/M3EU-DQWB] (applying Tadić to find that the civil war in Rwanda constituted an armed conflict).
60 E.g., Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 124 (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.
rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/CDF/785/SCSL-04-14-T-785.pdf [https://perma.cc/22DW-H79N].
61 E.g., Prosecutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision pursuant to Art. 61(7)(a) and (b) of the
Rome Statute, ¶ 229 (June 15, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_04528.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E8UA-L9ZS]. Only one case appears to openly challenge the Tadić framework, but it does
so in the context of determining the applicability of European Union refugee law. The Court of
Justice of the European Union held that “it must be acknowledged that an internal armed conflict
exists, for the purposes of applying [a] provision [of refugee law], if a State’s armed forces confront
one or more armed groups or if two or more armed groups confront each other” and that the Court
need not engage in an analysis of organization and intensity. Case C-285/12, Diakité v. Commissaire
Général aux Réfugiés et aux Apatrides, ¶ 35 (Jan. 30, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document
/document.jsf?text=&docid=147061&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1
&cid=541586 [https://perma.cc/7667-AV5L]. The Court’s decision was based on the notion that the
“EU legislature wished to grant subsidiary protection not only to persons affected by ‘international
armed conflicts’ and by ‘armed conflict not of an international character’, as defined in international
humanitarian law, but also to persons affected by internal armed conflict, provided that such conflict
involves indiscriminate violence.” Id. ¶ 21.
62 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (providing that its war crimes jurisdiction “applies to armed conflicts that take place in
the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities
and organized armed groups or between such groups”).
63 E.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT” DEFINED
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 4 (2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opin
ion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FLM-BXEZ]; PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN
57
58
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process to clarify the law applicable to cyberwar that included “distinguished
international law scholars and practitioners,”64 employs the Tadić test. The
Tallinn Manual repeatedly identifies issues on which these experts and
practitioners disagreed,65 but no one appears to have questioned the Tadić
formulation; rather, the Tallinn Manual states that the Tadić holding is
“widely accepted as setting forth the two key criteria for qualification as a
non-international armed conflict.”66 Meanwhile, there is little scholarly
appetite for challenging the intensity prong. There appear to be only two
academic articles that question Tadić or its subsequent application, and each
debates the relevance of the organizational prong far more than the intensity
prong.67 As noted above, the standard has become so well-established that
some scholars identify it as customary international law.68
Put simply, Tadić’s articulation of an intensity threshold to separate
NIACs from internal unrest is affirmed by the history and text of
international humanitarian law instruments governing NIACs, as well as by
state practice, international jurisprudence, and academic scholarship.
C. The Intensity Threshold and the Prohibition on the Use of Force
The intensity threshold serves a foundational goal of the modern
international legal order: minimizing states’ unilateral use of force. The U.N.
Charter represented a watershed moment for international law for several
reasons, chief among them its prohibition—articulated in Article 2(4)—against
the threat or use of force.69 Previously, states regularly resorted to using force
to settle a wide range of disputes.70 Article 2(4) reaffirmed a commitment first

POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD UNIV., COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 58-59 (2010),
http://ihlresearch.org/amw/Commentary%20on%20the%20HPCR%20Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/3R
AK-RPZG]; Quénivet, supra note 29.
64 Tallinn Manual Process, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEF. CTR. EXCELLENCE, https://
ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html [https://perma.cc/J6XZ-7KFQ].
65 See, e.g., INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS AT THE INVITATION OF THE NATO COOP. CYBER DEF.
CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER WARFARE 57 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013), https://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/docs/tallinn
manual?e=0/1803379 [https://perma.cc/Y8MS-JN6K] [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL] (exemplifying
a situation when the experts were divided on a legal point).
66 Id. at 87.
67 E.g., Blank & Corn, supra note 38; Dahl & Sandbu, supra note 39.
68 See, e.g., Quénivet, supra note 29, at 47 (claiming the Tadić case is “ingrained in customary
international law”).
69 See, e.g., Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 148 (Dec. 19) (“The prohibition against the use of force is a cornerstone of the
United Nations Charter.”).
70 See OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS (forthcoming 2017).
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made in 1928 to collectively limit this right.71 Article 2(4) provides, “All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”72
This general prohibition is subject to an express exception for actions
taken in self-defense.73 Article 51 provides that “[n]othing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
if an armed attack occurs . . . .”74 According to the text, an armed attack must
have already occurred for a state to take defensive measures. Under the
customary right to self-defense, however, states may also have the ability to
respond anticipatorily to attacks that are imminently threatened and that are
“instant, overwhelming, and leav[e] no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.”75 Responsive defensive force must be necessary to end the
threat and proportional to that used in the armed attack: it need not be a
mirror image of the initial attack, but rather must reflect a congruency
between the threat and the responsive military strategy.76
Article 2(4) and the self-defense exception simultaneously acknowledge
that states may sometimes need to employ unilateral defensive force and
attempt to minimize when states will use such force. The intensity threshold
serves a similar purpose with regard to the force states use against organized
non-state actors by ensuring that only states facing significant levels of
violence can respond in ways appropriate to an armed conflict. In both
situations, a state must experience a certain level of violence before it uses
responsive force pursuant to international humanitarian law, and in both
cases, that force must be necessary and proportionate.
As this Part has demonstrated, the intensity threshold is well-established
and congruent with the normative aims of the U.N. Charter. But its relevance
is less obvious when the state in which an organized non-state actor is located
consents to another state using force in its territory. The next Part considers
this complication.
Id.
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
Id. arts. 39, 51.
Id. art. 51.
Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Lord Ashburton, British Plenipotentiary
(Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412, 412 (1906); see also Rebecca
Crootof, Change Without Consent: How Customary International Law Modifies Treaties, 41 YALE J. INT’L L.
237, 252-55 (2016) (discussing how the teleological approach to treaty interpretation has allowed
understandings of Article 51 “to evolve in tandem with new developments in warfare and weaponry”).
76 Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 41 (July 8);
see also Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against an
Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2012) (noting that responsive
state action must be necessary and proportional).
71
72
73
74
75
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II. A POTENTIAL LOOPHOLE
The Tadić test is the legal standard for the initiation of a NIAC contained
within a state. Yet armed conflicts increasingly involve extraterritorial states using
force against organized non-state actors, justified on the basis of host state consent.
In such cases, there is a potential loophole created by overlapping legal regimes.
This Part examines the legal rules that make the loophole possible. First,
when an intervening state acts with the consent of the host state, there is no
need for an independent ad bellum legal basis for intervention. Furthermore,
the law of international armed conflict is not triggered because there is no
direct conflict between the two states. Second, under international law, sovereign
state consent is presumed to be legitimate unless it constitutes a manifest violation
of the state’s domestic law. Finally, states using force outside their own territory
face fewer human rights constraints than they would if they were deploying force
within their own territories.
Each of these rules, taken individually, is unobjectionable. But together, they
create a potential loophole in the legal regulation of the use of military force that
could leave consent-based interventions dangerously under-regulated.
A. The Ad Bellum Inquiry
An intervening state that wishes to use force against an organized non-state
actor in another state’s territory must comply with the prohibition on armed
interference. As noted above, Article 2(4) prohibits states from threatening or
using force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”77
The prohibition does not apply, however, if the host state consents to use
of force on its territory, presuming that the appropriate state authority grants
such consent and the intervening state operates within the scope of that
consent. Voluntary consent renders a state’s use of force lawful under jus ad
bellum, the law governing when one state may use force in another state’s
territory,78 and therefore obviates the need to pursue other lawful exceptions
77 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. Additionally, there is an independent customary international law—the
norm of non-intervention—that prohibits states from interfering in “matters in which each State is
permitted, by the principles of State sovereignty, to decide freely.” See Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27) (observing
that the principle of state sovereignty “forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or
indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States”); see also id. ¶ 209 (holding that, where
interference takes the form of a use or threat of force, Article 2(4) and the customary norm of
non-intervention are coterminous).
78 See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 118-23 (5th ed. 2011);
Ademola Abass, Consent Precluding State Responsibility: A Critical Analysis, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 211 (2004)
(describing circumstances that would allow use of force on another state). Intervening states must operate
within the scope of the consent and desist if consent is withdrawn. DINSTEIN, supra, at 121-22.
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to Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force.79 The lawfulness of
interventions not otherwise authorized thus hinges upon the consent or
request of the government of the host state: “Valid consent by a State to the
commission of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that
act in relation to the former State to the extent that the act remains within
the limits of that consent.”80 Military assistance may be “rendered by one state
to another at the latter’s request and with its consent, which may be given ad
hoc or in advance by treaty.”81
In the past decade and a half, dozens of armed interventions have been
authorized on the basis of consent—sometimes in the context of an ongoing
NIAC, sometimes not.82 As the local and global threats posed by organized
non-state actors show no signs of abating, host states will increasingly ask for
assistance, and extraterritorial states will increasingly intervene on the basis
of host state consent.
B. The Presumption of Lawful Consent
Under international law, a state may generally presume that another state’s
consent is legitimately granted under the consenting state’s domestic law. In
the treaty context, for instance, unless the error is glaring and highly significant,
a state cannot argue that an agreement is invalid either because the approval
process was flawed under domestic law or because the substantive content of
the agreement is inconsistent with domestic law.83 Defects in consent under
domestic law abrogate a treaty only if “that violation [of internal law] was
manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.”84
A violation of the state’s internal law is considered manifest “if it would be
See Deeks, supra note 7, at 15 n.43 (providing sources to support this conclusion).
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 20, in Int’l Law
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
81 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 435 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1996) (footnote omitted); see also Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 42-54 (Dec. 19) (analyzing the issue of consent between two countries).
82 Eliav Lieblich, Intervention and Consent: Consensual Forcible Interventions in Internal Armed
Conflicts as International Agreements, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 337, 339 (2011) (outlining both types of
interventions—those with and without force).
83 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 27, 46, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Although not party to the Vienna Convention, the United States
recognizes that most of its provisions constitute binding customary international law. See Sean D.
Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699, 721 n.71 (2005) (providing
support for the U.S. view that the Vienna Convention reflects international law). Additionally,
insofar as the Vienna Convention describes customary international law, it applies to all “international
agreements.” See Lieblich, supra note 82, at 362-63 (citing Vienna Convention art. 3). Thus, even if
consent is not formalized in a treaty, the Vienna Convention’s provisions provide useful, and
potentially binding, guidance on the interpretation of the agreement.
84 Vienna Convention, supra note 83, art. 46, at 343.
79
80
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objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance
with normal practice and in good faith.”85
This presumption of domestic legal validity extends beyond international
treaties to state consent more generally.86 Ashley Deeks explains,
International law allows one state to take at face value the commitments made
to it by another state. A state need not search behind another state’s consent
to unearth tensions between the international arrangement and the consenting
state’s domestic law. Nor may a state invoke its own domestic law as a reason
to breach its international obligations.87

Hence, in most circumstances, a state may lawfully act on consent from
another state, even if it was unlawfully given as a matter of the consenting
state’s domestic law.
Unfortunately, the presumptive validity of state consent has led many to
conflate state consent for the purpose of the ad bellum inquiry with the
question of whether the use of military force is appropriate under jus in bello.
This leads some to incorrectly conclude that an intervening state acting with
consent of the host state need not interrogate whether there is sufficient
violence to meet the intensity threshold for establishing a NIAC. Summarizing
the scholarly debate, Anders Henriksen writes,
[T]here is not universal agreement with regard to the role of consent in instances
involving the use of force, and some scholars reject consent as a valid basis in
those instances where the use of force would have been unlawful if the consenting
state had been acting. The better view, however, seems to be that consent does
preclude the unlawfulness of the use of force by one state in another state, even
in cases where the use of force would have been unlawful if carried out by the
consenting state. The existence of a valid consent from the host state will
therefore always absolve the state from international legal responsibility under jus
ad bellum as long as the use of force is conducted within the boundaries of that
consent. Furthermore, international law currently does not require a state to
ascertain whether or not the consent given by another state for the use of force
on its territory violates the latter state’s domestic laws.88

Id.
See Deeks, supra note 7, at 7-8 (discussing the spectrum of viewpoints on consent).
Id. at 3.
Anders Henriksen, Jus Ad Bellum and American Targeted Use of Force to Fight Terrorism Around the
World, 19 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 211, 220 (2014); see also Deeks, supra note 7, at 26-27 (“International
law today does not clearly prohibit states from using consent as a partial or complete rationale for
their forcible actions in another state’s territory, even where that consent purports to authorize an
activity that the host state legally could not undertake. It is therefore reasonable to expect that states
will continue to take advantage of the current ambiguity about consent to the use of force to evade
or ignore host state domestic laws that otherwise might limit that force.”).
85
86
87
88
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In short, Henriksen argues that intervening states are not accountable for
actions taken pursuant to host state consent, even if such action “would have
been unlawful if carried out by the consenting state.”89 As the next Section shows,
this problematic reading of the law has consequences for the legal protections
a state using force must observe.
C. The Extraterritorial State’s Limited Direct Human Rights Obligations
Does international human rights law limit the actions that an intervening
state may take against an organized non-state actor when the intervening state
is acting pursuant to a host state’s consent? The extent to which an
intervening state’s human rights obligations apply to its extraterritorial use
of force turns on two inquiries: first, whether human rights laws apply
extraterritorially and, second, what conditions trigger their application. Both
of these assessments are highly contested by international bodies and
international legal scholars.90 But even under the most aggressive reading, the
human rights obligations of states acting outside their own territory are
significantly more limited than those that apply to states acting within their
own territory.91 Accordingly, international human rights law imposes fewer
constraints on a state when it uses force against an organized non-state actor
in another state’s territory.
As an initial matter, an intervening state must determine whether and
which of its human rights obligations, under domestic and international law,
may have legal effect outside of its territorial borders. Many international
bodies have stated that various human rights treaties apply extraterritorially
in certain circumstances.92 The United States, which uses armed force outside
its borders more frequently than any other state,93 has taken a more
Henriksen, supra note 88 (emphasis added).
See Beth Van Schaack, The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human
Rights Obligations: Now Is the Time for Change, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 20, 20-25 (2014) (describing the
history of the dispute and the different viewpoints in modern context).
91 For more on the extraterritorial application of human rights law, see generally Oona A.
Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations Apply Extraterritorially?,
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389 (2011).
92 See Van Schaack, supra note 90, at 31-33 (describing the jurisprudence on extraterritorial
application of human rights).
93 See David Vine, The United States Probably Has More Foreign Military Bases than Any Other People,
Nation, or Empire in History, NATION (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-unitedstates-probably-has-more-foreign-military-bases-than-any-other-people-nation-or-empire-in-history/
[https://perma.cc/QU88-YQU5] (noting that “the United States has approximately 95% of the world’s
foreign bases” and arguing that “the global collection of bases has generally enabled the launching of
military interventions, drone strikes, and wars of choice”); The Uses of Force, ECONOMIST (Dec. 12,
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21590103-two-difficult-wars-offer-compelling-lessonsuses-force [https:// perma.cc/C3AV-JLS4] (“Modern America has shown an unrivalled appetite for battle.
During more than half the years since the end of the cold war it has been in combat. That is not just
89
90
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conservative view. For example, the United States currently maintains that
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) does not
apply outside its sovereign territory,94 although this position is hotly
debated.95 The United States also rejected the extraterritorial application of
the Convention Against Torture until 2014, but it now acknowledges that the
Convention applies outside of U.S. borders in areas where it exercises control
as a governmental authority.96
Next, the intervening state must evaluate whether the human rights
obligations that apply extraterritorially apply in the given situation. Even under
the most expansive interpretation of extraterritorial application of human rights
law adopted by relevant international bodies and courts, human rights obligations
are generally limited to situations in which a state exercises “effective control.”
Different international bodies explicating different treaties have developed
variations on the effective control test, but they have converged around the same
central principles. As Beth Van Schaack explains, “[A] longitudinal review of the
cases reveals a distinct trend toward an understanding that States’ human rights
obligations follow their agents and instrumentalities offshore whenever they are
in a position to respect—or to violate—the rights of individuals they confront
abroad.”97 This control test is grounded in the text of human rights instruments.98
Most cases involving state extraterritorial action against an organized
non-state actor will not meet the effective control standard. International
bodies have proven reluctant to apply human rights law to extraterritorial
because of the war in Iraq, which lasted from 2003 to 2011, and that in Afghanistan, which began two
years earlier and is still unfinished. Even before that, between 1989 and 2001 the United States intervened
abroad on average once every 16 months—more frequently than in any period in its history.”).
94 See Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital
Age, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 81, 102 (2015) (“The United States has argued that the [ICCPR’s] text precludes
any kind of extraterritorial application . . . . But the U.S. views on the extraterritorial application of the
ICCPR have not been as clear, long-standing or principled as some claim.”).
95 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Operationalizing Use of Drones Against Non-State Terrorists Under the
International Law of Self-Defense, 8 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 166, 190 (2015) (arguing that the ICCPR has
an extraterritorial and global reach); Van Schaack, supra note 90, at 53-65 (analyzing the issue and
the U.S. requirements vis-à-vis the ICCPR’s reach).
96 See Sarah Cleveland, The United States and the Torture Convention, Part I: Extraterritoriality, JUST
SECURITY (Nov. 14, 2014, 11:18 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/17435/united-states-torture-conventionpart-i-extraterritoriality [https://perma.cc/C5TL-WTRB] (describing the United States’ changing position
on the Convention Against Torture).
97 Van Schaack, supra note 90, at 32; see also SIKANDER AHMED SHAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN: THE LEGAL AND SOCIO-POLITICAL ASPECTS 121-38 (2015)
(surveying various standards for assessing the extraterritorial application of human rights laws and
evidencing, in general, a common preliminary requirement that the state exercise some level of
control over the territory before human rights obligations apply to its behavior).
98 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (prohibiting the arbitrary
deprivation of life and obligating a state to ensure human rights for all persons “within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction”).
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targeting.99 While limited authority suggesting otherwise exists,100 in most
cases involving extraterritorial intervention, intervening states lack the
control necessary to trigger their human rights obligations.101
D. The Potential Loophole
The intersection of varied legal regimes in consent-based extraterritorial
interventions against non-state actors risks creating a dangerous legal
loophole. Consider the following scenario: An organized non-state actor
poses a threat to both its host state and a nearby, would-be intervenor state,
but there has not yet been violence of sufficient intensity to meet the intensity
threshold. Nonetheless, concerned about the threat, the host state consents
to the nearby state using force that would be appropriate to an armed conflict,
which obviates the need for the intervening state to consider other jus ad
bellum justifications for its forceful intervention. The intervening state
assumes that the host state’s consent to armed intervention is valid as a matter
of its domestic law, which includes its human rights obligations toward
individuals in the territory. At the same time, the limited extraterritorial
application of human rights law means that the intervening state is likely to
determine that it has few or no human rights obligations to people located in
territory over which it exercises no effective control. The intervening state
then deploys armed force that the host state would have been legally
prohibited from using itself.

99 See, e.g., Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 355 (“In sum, the case-law of the
Court demonstrates that its recognition of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a
Contracting State is exceptional . . . .”). For an argument that Banković has been “all but limited . . .
to its facts,” see Van Schaack, supra note 90, at 44-48.
100 See, e.g., Alejandre v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 86/99,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 25 (1999) (“[W]hen agents of a state, whether military or civilian,
exercise power and authority over persons outside national territory, the state’s obligation to respect
human rights continues . . . .”); Jake William Rylatt, An Evaluation of the U.S. Policy of “Targeted
Killing” Under International Law: The Case of Anwar al-Aulaqi (Part II), 44 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 115,
137 (2014) (surveying the academic literature and arguing that “targeting someone with the intention
to take their life is the very definition of controlling an individual, body and fate, even for the split
second before their life ends”).
101 See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 90, at 35-40 (arguing that a strict definition of control is
problematic because states are able to violate rights of individuals abroad without “fully controlling”
the places those violations occur); see also Paust, supra note 95, at 190-91 (“[T]he global human right to
freedom from arbitrary deprivation of life under the International Covenant will only apply to persons
who are either within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (including U.S. occupied territory)
or within its actual power or effective control. It is evident, therefore, that persons being targeted by a
high-flying drone in a foreign country will not be entitled to protection with respect to the human right
to life that is otherwise guaranteed in the International Covenant.” (footnotes omitted)).
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As the events discussed in the Introduction suggest, this scenario is not a
mere hypothetical.102 The opportunities for states to exploit this potential
loophole in the law have become all too frequent.
III. THE STAKES
Although states originally intended to limit the influence of international
law on their internal affairs by setting a high intensity threshold for
recognizing a NIAC, the international legal environment has since changed
dramatically. In the wake of the human rights revolution, international legal
obligations regulate states’ conduct toward persons in their territories in both
peacetime and times of armed conflict. In this new context, the intensity
threshold helps determine which international legal regime governs a state’s
internal conflicts with organized non-state actors. Above the threshold,
international humanitarian law applies; below the threshold, domestic law
and the state’s human rights obligations apply.
The loophole threatens this important distinction. If intervening states
are not required to act consistent with the host state’s human rights
obligations in below-the-threshold conflicts, individuals in the host states are
left underprotected. As discussed above, states using force outside their own
territories have fewer direct human rights obligations than they would if they
were acting within their own territories—and fewer than the host state itself,
which is clearly obligated to apply human rights law to conflicts with non-state
actors below the intensity threshold.103 Additionally, the law applicable to
NIACs in some cases offers less robust protections than does international
human rights law. Here we outline the international human rights law and
international humanitarian law governing deadly force and detention to
illustrate some of the protections that are at risk if the distinction between
low intensity unrest and NIACs disappears.

102 Ashley Deeks also suggests this potential loophole is far from imaginary. See Deeks, supra
note 7, at 27 (“It is therefore reasonable to expect that states will continue to take advantage of the
current ambiguity about consent to the use of force to evade or ignore host state domestic laws that
otherwise might limit that force.”).
103 Fully addressing whether and to what extent human rights law applies in armed conflict is
beyond the scope of this Article. However, two of the authors have previously addressed this issue.
In many situations—and not entirely surprisingly, given their common interest in protecting human
life and dignity—international humanitarian law and international human rights law are
complementary and may coexist. For a more extensive discussion, see generally Oona A. Hathaway,
Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, William Perdue, Chelsea Purvis & Julia Spiegel, Which
Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1883 (2012).
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A. Use of Deadly Force
The right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life is a jus cogens norm—a
peremptory, non-derogable norm binding on all states.104 However, international
human rights law and international humanitarian law define an “arbitrary”
deprivation of life differently.
1. International Human Rights Law
A number of human rights instruments constrain state parties’ use of
lethal force.105 International bodies have set minimum standards of respect
for the right to life in law enforcement operations. Additionally, human rights
committees and courts—including the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the
European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, and the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders—have elaborated international human rights
constraints on the use of lethal force. Taken together, these constraints
illustrate a general consensus that states are obligated to protect the right to
life in law enforcement operations.
At least two of these bodies have arrived at each of the following
principles: First, legality governs the use of deadly force. Since “[t]he
deprivation of life by the authorities of the State is a matter of the utmost
gravity . . . the law must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which
a person may be deprived of his life by such authorities.”106 Second, relevant
104 See, e.g., Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights,
12 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 431 (1989) (noting the prominent position provided to
the right to life in “virtually every major international human rights instrument”).
105 See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter American Convention] (“No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”); ICCPR,
supra note 98, art. 6(1) (“No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life.”); European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221 [hereinafter European Convention] (“No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in
the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is
provided by law.”). Furthermore, most mandate that courts construe exceptions narrowly. See U.N.
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 6, Article 6 (Sixteenth Session, 1982), ¶ 1
[hereinafter HRC Comment No. 6] (observing that the right to life “should not be interpreted
narrowly”), reprinted in U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994); see also McCann v. United
Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 46 (1995) (noting that exceptions to the right to life
“indicate[] that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed from that
normally applicable”).
106 HRC Comment No. 6, supra note 105, ¶ 3; see also Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, ¶ 85 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Oct. 24, 2012), http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/
casos/articulos/seriec_251_ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSC5-FW2S] (requiring the use of force to
abide by the principles of “legality, absolute necessity, and proportionality”); Basic Principles on the
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials ¶¶ 1, 11 [hereinafter Basic Principles]
(requiring law enforcement rules to “[e]nsure that firearms are used only in appropriate circumstances
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national laws or regulations must only permit the use of lethal force when it is
necessary. Law enforcement officers may only use lethal force “in their own
defence or that of others, or . . . [when] necessary to effect the arrest or prevent
the escape of the persons concerned,”107 if the potential escapee poses a serious
safety threat to others.108 Third, the use of deadly force must be proportional.
Specifically, law enforcement must “[e]xercise restraint in such use [of force]
and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate
objective to be achieved.”109 Fourth, states must use care when executing plans
involving the potential use of deadly force. States must exercise the “degree of
caution expected from a law-enforcement body in a democratic society,” and
their actions must be “compatible with the standard of care prerequisite to an
operation . . . involving the use of lethal force by State agents.”110
While there is no per se prohibition on the use of military force to achieve
law enforcement ends, the use of military personnel without proper law
enforcement training may reflect a failure to exercise “the degree of caution
in the use of firearms to be expected from law enforcement personnel in a
democratic society.”111 Similarly, the use of military-grade weaponry without
a prior evacuation of civilians may, depending on the circumstances, violate
the right to life, as “[t]he massive use of indiscriminate weapons” does not
reflect the requisite care required by human rights law.112
Moreover, experts generally understand the right to life to require that
states adhere to a progressive use of force and distinguish moments when
states initiate law enforcement actions from moments when violence crosses
and in a manner likely to decrease the risk of unnecessary harm”), in U.N. Secretariat, Eighth United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.144/28/Rev.1 (Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990).
107 U.N. Human Rights Comm., View Under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Communication No. 45/1979: Husband of Maria
Fanny Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia, ¶ 13.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/l (Mar. 31, 1982).
108 See McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45 (noting that a level of force no stronger than
“absolutely necessary” may be used to “prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained” (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting European Convention, supra note 105, art. 2)).
109 Basic Principles, supra note 106, ¶ 5(a); see also Dorzema, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ¶ 85 (requiring
the use of force to abide by the principles of “legality, absolute necessity, and proportionality”).
110 Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, ¶ 191 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 24, 2005). While Isayeva dealt
with a situation in Chechnya that is almost certainly a NIAC, the principles included in this discussion
are human rights law principles. See McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 62 (“[T]he Court is not
persuaded that the killing of the three terrorists constituted the use of force which was no more than
absolutely necessary in defence of persons from unlawful violence . . . .”); Noam Lubell, Challenges in
Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 737, 742-44 (2005) (stating
that Isayeva’s “assessment has strong foundations in human rights law, but perhaps is not exactly the
same formulation as would be used for military operations in an armed conflict”).
111 McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 61-62 (noting the difference between the standard of
care taken by the police when using firearms and that used by soldiers).
112 Isayeva, App. No. 57950/00, ¶ 191.
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the intensity threshold and creates a NIAC.113 Initially, states must act in
accordance with domestic law enforcement policies and relevant human
rights law, which includes attempting to arrest or disarm the non-state actor
without using lethal force. If, however, the non-state actor responds by
threatening the lives of law enforcement officers or civilians, the state may
use lethal force. When the state gradually increases force in response to the
organized non-state actor’s reactions, it may eventually convert the situation
into a NIAC.114 Yet classifying the situation as a NIAC and triggering the
application of international humanitarian law does not retroactively apply
international humanitarian law to the state’s initial action. This is the logical
corollary of the intensity threshold: until a state crosses the intensity
threshold, a NIAC does not exist and domestic laws governing law
enforcement apply.
2. International Humanitarian Law
Once armed conflict begins, the rules change. As some of us have noted
elsewhere, “Humanitarian law permits state agents to intentionally kill combatants
and incidentally kill civilians (within clearly proscribed limits) in circumstances
that human rights law does not countenance.”115
International humanitarian law allows state parties to armed conflict to use
deadly force against enemy combatants. On first look, this may appear similar
to the right of law enforcement to use deadly force: the right of a soldier to kill an
enemy soldier that poses a deadly threat is similar, after all, to the self-defensive
right under international human rights law of a law enforcement officer to kill
a criminal who poses a deadly threat to the officer. But under international
humanitarian law, the right to kill enemy combatants goes further. Under
international humanitarian law, “[e]nemy combatants do not have to pose a
specific threat at the time they are targeted, nor do state agents have to attempt
to arrest them before killing them.”116 In short, international humanitarian law

113 See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights Standards and Practice for the Police,
34, U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/5/Add.3 (2004); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE USE OF FORCE IN
LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 2 (2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/12747/the-use-offorce-in-law-enforcement-icrc-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL6E-P6FD].
114 For example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held that a thirty-hour
battle between a state and an insurgent group constituted a NIAC due to the intensity of the fighting.
Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98,
doc. 6 rev. ¶¶ 147, 154-56 (1997).
115 Hathaway, Crootof, Levitz, Nix, Perdue, Purvis & Spiegel, supra note 103, at 1926.
116 Id. at 1927; see also Michael N. Schmitt, Wound, Capture, or Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman’s
‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants,’ 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 855, 860 (2013). But see Ryan
Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 819, 824-826 (2013).
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recognizes the right of states engaged in armed conflict to kill enemy
combatants, subject to humanitarian exceptions.117
The dividing line between international human rights law and
international humanitarian law affects civilians as well. The latter “permits
state agents to kill noncombatant civilians in the course of attacking enemy
combatants as long as the attack is aimed at a concrete and direct military
objective and the resulting harm to civilians is necessary and proportionate
to that objective.”118 Additionally, international humanitarian law arguably
permits states to target civilians who are “directly participating in
hostilities,”119 even if they are not members of the organized non-state actor.
To be sure, a variety of constraints limit the use of lethal force under
international humanitarian law. These constraints include distinction, necessity,
and proportionality. The principle of necessity in international humanitarian
law, for example, permits the use of force only to the extent that it “is required
in order to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete
or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the
minimum expenditure of life and resources.”120 The proportionality
requirement prohibits attacks when “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof . . . would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”121 Moreover, commanders must “take all feasible precautions in
the choice of means and methods of warfare with a view to avoiding, and in any
event to minimising, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects.”122 This requires commanders to take steps to
protect civilian life even when an attack is proportionate.
Notwithstanding these important limitations on the use of force in armed
conflict, it is clear that the limitations differ from—and are sometimes less
protective than—those imposed by human rights law. These differences can
have consequences for individuals on the ground in conflict zones and thus
illustrate the importance of maintaining the intensity threshold even in
consent-based interventions.

117 See, e.g., 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 164-70 (reprt. 2009).
118 Hathaway, Crootof, Levitz, Nix, Perdue, Purvis & Spiegel, supra note 103, at 1927.
119 NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 69 (2009).
120 Id. at 79.
121 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(5)(b), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
122 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 117, at 56-58.
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B. Detention
The intensity threshold also shapes a state’s ability to detain suspected
members of an organized non-state actor without derogating from human
rights agreements.123 Although scholars continue to debate whether
international humanitarian law authorizes detention in NIACs, they agree
that international humanitarian law regulates detention when it occurs—and,
moreover, that these rules differ from those under international human rights
law. Here, we briefly explore the different rules of the two bodies of law to
once again illustrate the stakes of applying the intensity threshold in NIACs.
1. International Human Rights Law
International human rights law guarantees the right to liberty and
constrains states’ ability to detain individuals.124 First, it prohibits states from
“arbitrarily” detaining individuals,125 requiring that the basis for detention be
established in law and safeguarded by procedural protections.126 Second,
several multilateral human rights conventions require states to promptly
inform arrested and detained persons of the reasons for the arrest and
detention;127 they also require states to bring detainees before a court for
either timely trial or release.128 Third, these conventions also confer on
detainees the right to a fair trial.129 With some narrow exceptions,130 this
requires a criminal trial that entitles the detainees to a public hearing before

123 There is a clear distinction between a state’s detention authority under human rights law and
under international humanitarian law governing international armed conflicts (conflicts between two or
more states). See Hathaway, Crootof, Levitz, Nix, Perdue, Purvis & Spiegel, supra note 103, at 1930-35.
124 See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 105, art. 7 (securing the “right to personal
liberty”); ICCPR, supra note 98, art. 9 (providing the “right to liberty and security of person”);
European Convention, supra note 105, art. 5 (outlining the “right to liberty and security”).
125 American Convention, supra note 105, art. 7(3); ICCPR, supra note 98, art. 9(1); European
Convention, supra note 105, art. 5(1).
126 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 35: Liberty and Security of Person
(Article 9), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014). Moreover, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee interprets the prohibition against arbitrary detention “to include elements of
inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law, as well as elements of
reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.” Id. ¶ 12 (footnote omitted).
127 American Convention, supra note 105, art. 7(4); ICCPR, supra note 98, art. 9(2); European
Convention, supra note 105, art. 5(2).
128 American Convention, supra note 105, art. 7(5); ICCPR, supra note 98, art. 9(3); European
Convention, supra note 105, art. 5(3).
129 American Convention, supra note 105, art. 8; ICCPR, supra note 98, arts. 9(4), 14(1);
European Convention, supra note 105, art. 6(1).
130 Detention without trial is permissible in some cases pending trial, for reasons related to the
detainee’s physical or mental health and for reasons related to immigration. See Report on Terrorism
and Human Rights, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L./V/II.116, doc. 5 rev. ¶¶ 118, 124 (2002)
(allowing the deprivation of liberty without trial in limited, pre-legislated circumstances).
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an impartial tribunal, the right to be informed of charges against them,131 the right
to defend themselves,132 the right to an interpreter,133 the right to cross-examine
witnesses,134 the presumption of innocence until proven guilty,135 the right to
appeal,136 the right to appointed counsel,137 and the right to prepare a defense.138
The regional European and American human rights instruments include
similar protections.139
In short, international human rights law allows the state to detain an
individual only when the basis for that detention is established by law, is
subject to substantial procedural protections, and comports with broader
principles of justice.
2. International Humanitarian Law
There is debate about the precise scope of detention authority under
international humanitarian law governing NIACs. Despite this continuing
debate, it is clear that the law regulates detention authority far differently
than does international human rights law.
International humanitarian law distinguishes between detention of combatants
and civilians. When a state captures members of the enemy’s armed forces, it is
entitled to intern them as prisoners of war (POWs) without trial for the duration
of the conflict.140 POW status immunizes detainees from lawful combat
activities141 and allows post-conflict detention only when a detainee has been
convicted of a war crime or of crimes committed during internment.142 POW

ICCPR, supra note 98, art. 14(3)(a).
Id. art. 14(3)(d).
Id. art. 14(3)(f).
Id. art. 14(3)(e).
Id. art. 14(2).
Id. art. 14(5).
Id. art. 14(3)(d).
Id. art. 14(3)(b).
See American Convention, supra note 105, art. 8 (outlining minimum guarantees provided
to each person accused of a criminal offense); European Convention, supra note 105, art. 6 (securing
the right to be presumed innocent, have access to counsel, use an interpreter, receive adequate time
to prepare, and examine witnesses).
140 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 21, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III] (providing guidelines for the
treatment of Prisoners of War).
141 See id. art. 23 (forbidding Detaining Powers from sending a POW to “areas where he may
be exposed to the fire of the combat zone”).
142 See id. arts. 95–96, 99, 103–07 (permitting POWs to be tried or sentenced only for acts
forbidden by local domestic law or by international law); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 121,
art. 75(4)(d) (requiring that POWs be “presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”);
Additional Protocol II, supra note 32, art. 6(5) (requiring the “authorities in power” to “endeavour to
grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict”).
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
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status also entitles detainees to decline to answer questions.143 A state in
international armed conflict may detain civilians as well, but only in instances
where “security . . . makes it absolutely necessary”144 or for “imperative reasons
of security.”145 In such instances, civilians are entitled to have a competent
tribunal review the basis for their internment.146 Because they do not benefit
from POW immunity, civilian detainees may be tried and detained for crimes
committed pursuant to their participation in hostilities.147 In such cases, the state
is constrained by some procedural guarantees, but these guarantees are limited
vis-à-vis the constraints of human rights law; for example, a military tribunal,
rather than a civilian court, may hear the case, and there is no right to appointed
counsel for the defendant.148
While the international humanitarian law governing international armed
conflict clearly confers detention authority to states, the international humanitarian
law governing NIACs presents a trickier case. Indeed, as one commentator
has explained, this area of law “is utterly silent on the question of who can be
interned, for what reasons, for how long and in accordance with which
procedures.”149 This silence has spurred efforts to articulate principles
governing detention in a NIAC,150 and there is significant scholarly debate
about how to read the absence of any explicit authorization or prohibition on
detention in international humanitarian law governing NIACs.151 On one side,
scholars argue that the treaty- and custom-based international humanitarian
law of NIACs does include such implicit power distinct from detention

143 In response to questioning, POWs need only respond with their name, rank, serial number,
and date of birth. Geneva Convention III, supra note 140, art. 17.
144 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 42,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
145 Id. art. 78.
146 Id. arts. 43, 78 (requiring a court or administrative board to review the internment at least
two times per year).
147 Id. arts. 71–74 (permitting arrest for actions “which, according to the law of the occupied
State, would have justified extradition in time of peace”).
148 Id. art. 66 (permitting the Occupying Power to “hand over the accused to its properly
constituted, non-political military courts”).
149 ELS DEBUF, CAPTURED IN WAR: LAWFUL INTERNMENT IN ARMED CONFLICT 451 (2013).
150 See generally THE COPENHAGEN PROCESS ON THE HANDLING OF DETAINEES IN INT’L
MILITARY OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES & GUIDELINES (2012), http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/
English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomacy/Copenhangen%20Process%20Principles%20and
%20Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU4X-7RN2] [hereinafter COPENHAGEN PROCESS] (outlining
“principles to guide the implementation of . . . existing obligations with respect to detention in
international military operations”).
151 This Article necessarily includes an abbreviated discussion of the debate. For a detailed
analysis, see YALE LAW SCH. CTR. FOR GLOB. LEGAL CHALLENGES, STATE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR NON-STATE ACTORS THAT DETAIN IN THE COURSE OF A NIAC 3-11 (2015),
https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/yls_glc_state_responsibility_for_nsas_that_detain_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AD75-USH5].
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authority established under domestic law.152 In particular, this camp argues
that “the legal basis for status-based detention is both implicit in the scheme
of [Common Article 3] and [the Second Additional Protocol]” and that
customary international humanitarian law governs detention in a NIAC.153
These scholars have argued, for example, that customary international
humanitarian law allows status-based detention in NIACs.154
On the other side of the debate, the English Court of Appeals and several
scholars suggest that the international humanitarian law of NIACs does not
include any independent detention authority.155 Moreover, representatives

152 See, e.g., Sean Aughey & Aurel Sari, Targeting and Detention in Non-International Armed
Conflict: Serdar Mohammed and the Limits of Human Rights Convergence, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 60, 93
(2015) (arguing that a legal basis for detention can be found in treaties and customary law); Sean
Aughey & Aurel Sari, IHL Does Authorise Detention in NIAC: What the Sceptics Get Wrong, EJIL:
TALK! (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/ihl-does-authorise-detention-in-niac-what-the-scepticsget-wrong [https://perma.cc/FBX9-2UX7] [hereinafter Aughey & Sari, International Humanitarian
Law] (arguing that “the legal basis for status-based detention is both implicit in the scheme of CA3
and AP II . . . and founded in customary international law”); Kubo Mačák, No Legal Basis Under
IHL for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts? A Comment on Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry
of Defence, EJIL: TALK! (May 5, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/no-legal-basis-under-ihl-for-detentionin-non-international-armed-conflicts-a-comment-on-serdar-mohammed-v-ministry-of-defence [https://
perma.cc/9UPP-6ZMF] (arguing that “the best of the three possible conceptualisations of the
applicable provisions is that they provide an implied permission to detain in NIACs”); cf. CHATHAM
HOUSE & INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, EXPERT MEETING ON PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
FOR SECURITY DETENTION IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 1, 3-4 (2008),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/security-detention-chatham-icrc-report-091209.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W5NT-7A9C] (describing a group of experts convened by Chatham House and the
International Committee of the Red Cross who “quite easily” agreed that although there is no right to
detain in NIAC, international humanitarian law contains an “inherent power . . . to intern” that belongs
to “any party to a NIAC”).
153 Aughey & Sari, International Humanitarian Law, supra note 152.
154 Id.
155 See, e.g., Mohammed v. Ministry of Def. [2014] EWHC (QB) 1369, [239]–[268] (Eng.) (refusing to
accept arguments that “IHL provides a legal basis for detention by UK armed forces operating in
Afghanistan”); Ryan Goodman, Authorization vs. Regulation of Detention: What Serdar Mohammed v. MoD Got
Right and Wrong, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 5, 2015, 8:15 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/19755/authorizationvs-regulation-detention-serdar-mohammed-v-mod-wrong [https://perma.cc/QA55-ADY8] (“[I]nternational
human rights, as a body of law, does not provide the source of authority to detain.”); Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne
& Dapo Akande, Does IHL Provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts?, EJIL: TALK!
(May 7, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-internationalarmed-conflicts [https://perma.cc/QC65-DBFG] (“If either the applicable treaty provisions or customary
international law could be said to provide a legal basis for detention in NIACs, one would expect practice
generally to confirm this. This does not, however, seem to be the case.”); Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne & Dapo
Akande, Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts: A Rejoinder to Aurel Sari,
EJIL: TALK! (June 2, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/locating-the-legal-basis-for-detention-in-noninternational-armed-conflicts-a-rejoinder-to-aurel-sari [https://perma.cc/QRK3-L8Y4] (arguing that there is
“a distinction between authorising and not prohibiting conduct in international law”); Jonathan Horowitz,
Guest Post: IHL Doesn’t Regulate NIAC Internment—A Drafting History Perspective, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 9,
2015, 8:41 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/02/09/guest-post-ihl-doesnt-regulate-niac-internmentdrafting-history-perspective [https://perma.cc/AJ4T-48YD] (arguing that the drafting record of the IHL
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from several states and international bodies participated in the so-called
Copenhagen Process in an attempt “to develop principles to guide the
implementation of the existing obligations with respect to detention in
international military operations,”156 which might be viewed as implicitly
suggesting that international humanitarian law does not authorize detention
in NIACs. According to scholars and courts in this camp, the state may still
detain individuals in a NIAC, but its authority to do so is derived from its
domestic law and thus subject to human rights law constraints.
In short, the extent to which the intensity threshold affects the state’s
detention authority depends on one’s view of this unsettled debate. To the extent
that the former group is correct, the state’s authority to detain members of the
organized non-state actor increases significantly once a NIAC is established and
may mirror the detention authority of international armed conflicts.
To be sure, a state can derogate from some (but not all) international
human rights law commitments regarding detention, whether or not it is in a
NIAC;157 however, derogation must be proclaimed openly, notice must be
given to the relevant international bodies, and derogation is only permissible
with proper justification due to public emergency.158 As a result, states are
often reticent to derogate as a functional matter, depending on the intricacies
of the political situation on the ground.
In sum, although the debate over the precise rules that govern detention in a
NIAC remains unsettled, the different rules governing detention in international
humanitarian law and international human rights law illustrate the importance of
the intensity threshold’s distinction between NIACs and ordinary violence.159

indicates “an overarching IHL structure that resisted bringing IAC internment rules into the IHL
of NIAC”).
156 COPENHAGEN PROCESS, supra note 150, ¶ II.
157 States may derogate from certain detention norms. See, e.g., Lawless v. Ireland (Merits), 1961 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 62. Other norms, such as habeas corpus, are non-derogable. See, e.g., Customary IHL
Rule 99. Deprivation of Liberty, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule99 [https://perma.cc/ZFK9-6RKC] (describing habeas corpus as an essential right
that is non-derogable under the American Convention on Human Rights).
158 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 98, art. 4 (allowing states to derogate from their obligations in “time
of public emergency”); European Convention, supra note 105, art. 15 (allowing limited derogations from
the Convention during times of emergency, “provided that such measures are not inconsistent with [a
state’s] other obligations under international law”); U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Human Rights Comm.,
The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN/.4/1985/4, annex (Sept. 28, 1984) (outlining circumstances in
which derogation is permitted and providing guidelines for such derogation); U.N. Human Rights
Comm., General Comment No. 29, Article 4: Derogations During a State of Emergency, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) (limiting a state’s measures derogating from its obligations “to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”).
159 For more such examples, see Hathaway, Crootof, Levitz, Nix, Perdue, Purvis & Spiegel,
supra note 103, at 1930-35.
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IV. CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE
Having described a potential loophole raised by consent-based interventions
and its associated dangers, we now consider how best to close the loophole. We
argue that both states involved in an extraterritorial conflict have an independent
obligation to evaluate whether the intensity threshold has been met when deciding
what level of force may appropriately be used against an organized non-state actor.
A host state must determine what legal regime governs to know to what actions
it may lawfully give its consent. At the same time, an intervening state must
evaluate whether the consent given is a manifest violation of the host state’s
human rights obligations to individuals in its territory.
Where violence between the host state and an organized non-state actor has
not satisfied the intensity threshold, the intervening state may still use force, but
it must do so consistent with the human rights obligations of the host state. Both
states may still use the full panoply of law enforcement tools that states deploy
to address violent threats that do not constitute armed conflicts situations.
This approach is rooted in principles of international law: International
humanitarian law and international human rights law are both designed, at their
core, to protect the dignity and fundamental rights of persons. It would
therefore undermine both if the interaction of the two bodies of law created a
legal vacuum. The approach offered here relies, moreover, on simple logic: states
cannot give away what they do not possess, particularly when doing so has the
effect of undermining fundamental commitments of international law.
A. How to Close the Loophole: Independent Obligations to Evaluate the
Lawfulness of Consent
1. Limits on the Host State’s Ability to Give Consent
States are required to safeguard the human rights of individuals in their
territory. The Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights,
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found, respectively, that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on
Human Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights include positive
obligations on states to protect individuals’ right to life, including an obligation to
protect individuals from terrorism and violence by non-state actors.160
Accordingly, as a legal matter, a state may not lawfully consent to actions
that would violate the human rights of the very people the state is supposed
160 See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS,
TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 8 nn.10-12 (2007), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/79XS-ALJY] (surveying the approach of various
international organizations to the right to life).
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to protect.161 As the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions has observed,
States cannot consent to the violation of their obligations under
international humanitarian law or international human rights law. A State
that consents to the activities of another State on its territory remains bound
by its own human rights obligations, including to ensure respect for human
rights and thus to prevent violations of the right to life, to the extent that it
is able to do so.162

This positive obligation to safeguard human rights includes the responsibility
to withhold consent to uses of military force that would be unlawful in
situations that do not meet the intensity threshold and therefore do not
constitute armed conflicts.163
A state should be prohibited from consenting to an action it cannot
lawfully take itself because a state cannot delegate authority it does not have.
If it were to do so, that should be considered a breach of its human rights
obligations. This approach has an intuitive, logical appeal. Indeed, the
principle that no one can transfer a greater right than one holds—nemo plus
iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse habet—undergirds many legal
regimes.164 Just as a principal cannot delegate authority to an agent that the
principal does not have, a host state cannot grant an extraterritorial state
permission to act in contravention of the host state’s human rights obligations.
While admittedly sparse in this area, case law supports the principle that
a state’s consent cannot exceed its own authority. In Kadi v. Council, the Court
of First Instance of the European Communities stated, “By concluding [that
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community] between them[,
Member States] could not transfer to the Community more powers than they
possessed or withdraw from their obligations to third countries under [the
161 See ICCPR, supra note 98, art. 2(1) (requiring states to ensure that their citizens receive the
rights guaranteed by the ICCPR); see also U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80],
The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) (requiring states to “adopt legislative, judicial, administrative,
educative, and other appropriate measures in order to fulfil[l] their legal obligations”).
162 Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions),
Rep. on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. A/68/382 (Sept. 13, 2013).
163 Louise Doswald-Beck, Unexpected Challenges: The Increasingly Evident Disadvantage of Considering
International Humanitarian Law in Isolation, 11 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2012) (“[A] State has human
rights obligations toward those within its jurisdiction and normally extra-judicial executions are a
violation of the right to life. . . . Asking or allowing another State to attack . . . is a violation of the
asking State’s human rights obligations, and the attacking State is complicit in that violation.”
(foonote omitted)).
164 Terry D. Gill, Military Intervention with the Consent or at the Invitation of a Government, in
THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 253 & n.7 (Terry D.
Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2d ed. 2015).
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United Nations] Charter.”165 Following a similar principle, in Soering v. United
Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights prevented the transfer of a
juvenile from the United Kingdom to the United States because of the
possibility that the juvenile might face the death penalty in violation of U.K.
human rights commitments.166 According to Deeks, this decision exemplifies
the European Court of Human Rights’ doctrine that “a Council of Europe
member state may not consent to certain actions (or risk of actions) by
another state that the member state itself could not undertake.”167
The few scholars who have considered related issues reach similar
conclusions. Deeks argues that “[c]onsent—at least when it is used to affect legal
relationships—generally contemplates a transfer only of those rights, privileges,
powers, or immunities that the consenting entity itself possesses.”168 For support,
she points to property law,169 contract law, 170 agency law,171 and the separation-ofpowers doctrine.172 Terry Gill concurs, writing that a state’s inability to consent to
more than it can do is “a logical consequence of the fact that a State’s government
may not grant more authority than it itself possesses under international law.”173
Michael Schmitt has also intimated this argument in discussing the use of drones
in Pakistan.174 By implicitly limiting the scope of consent before an armed conflict
to circumstances in which the host state “requests the other state’s assistance in
complying with its obligation to police its own territory” or “seeks assistance with
its own law enforcement operation against terrorists,” Schmitt suggests that a
state cannot consent to an action it could not itself lawfully take.175
165 Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council, 2005 E.C.R II-3659, ¶ 195; see also Deeks, supra note 7, at 33
n.134 (discussing Kadi).
166 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44-45 (1989); see also Deeks, supra
note 7, at 34 n.137 (discussing Soering).
167 Deeks, supra note 7, at 34.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 34 n.136 (citing the common law property rule of nemo dat quod non habet).
170 Id. (quoting Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 292
(1986) for the proposition that “the enforceability of all agreements is limited by what rights are
capable of being transferred from one person to another”).
171 Id. (quoting W. EDWARD SELL, SELL ON AGENCY 8 (1975) for the proposition that “[i]n
general, a principal can authorize an agent to perform any act or enter into any transaction which he
himself could do, and with the same results and legal consequences”).
172 Id. (quoting Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp.
447, 450 (W.D. Wash. 1978) for the proposition that “the rule-making power delegated by Congress to the
Supreme Court is limited in scope to those which Congress could have rightfully exercised”).
173 Gill, supra note 164, at 253.
174 See CHATHAM HOUSE, MEETING SUMMARY: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
DRONES 6 (2010), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%
20Law/il211010drones.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7XM-DHHQ] (summarizing Schmitt’s comments).
175 Id.; see also id. (observing that, in law enforcement operations, human rights law applies); John
Lawrence Hargrove, Intervention by Invitation and the Politics of the New World Order (“In general, conduct
involving the threat or use of force by one state, in derogation of the sovereign prerogatives of another, is
unlawful. Such conduct may, however, be made lawful by the consent of the latter state—provided it does
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In situations where a host state cannot use force itself, it cannot lawfully
consent to the use of force by an intervening state to sidestep its international
human rights obligations.176 But what are the intervening state’s obligations
if a host state ignores this rule and nevertheless consents to unlawful uses of
force against organized non-state actors in its territory?
2. Limits on the Intervening State’s Ability to Accept Consent
The intervening state’s ability to presume valid consent should be limited.
An intervening state should continue to be permitted to assume valid consent
under the host state’s domestic law: it need not “look under the hood” to
determine if the host state’s consent was made via the legitimate domestic law
processes. However, an intervening state can be expected to recognize
manifest violations of shared international human rights law obligations, and
it should be held internationally responsible if it contributes to such violations
by acting pursuant to consent given in manifest violation of those obligations.
a. Requirement to Assess Consistency of Consent with International Law
Treaty and customary law indicate that reliance on consent is not justified
when such reliance would clearly aid a state in violating its human rights
obligations.177 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes that
states may not invariably presume that another state’s consent is valid; the
Draft Articles on State Responsibility (Draft Articles) emphasize that states
may not facilitate others’ commission of internationally wrongful acts.178 Taken
together, these authorities suggest that intervening states have an obligation
not entail activities which would have been unlawful by the latter state if acting alone. (The last point has
nothing peculiarly to do with forcible intervention, but follows from the fact that states, being sovereign,
have the capacity to consent to restrictions on their sovereign rights if they find it useful to do so, and that
moreover, they can lawfully do together what—but only what—one of them might lawfully do alone.)”
(emphasis omitted)), in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 113, 116-17 (Lori Fisler
Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
176 See, e.g., Deeks, supra note 7, at 27-32 (arguing that a state should not ask another state to use levels
of force that the requesting state is not permitted to use); Mark Gibney et al., Transnational State Responsibility
for Violations of Human Rights, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 267, 267 (1999) (“International law is designed to
make each state responsible for the human rights protection of its own population . . . .”).
177 Deeks has observed, “An overriding goal in developing international human rights law over
the last half-century has been to respond to perceived inadequacies in the way states protect
individual rights under their own laws. As a result, it has been salutary to rely on . . . [uninterrogated] consent to allow new international legal protections to trump inconsistent domestic
laws.” Deeks, supra note 7, at 11 (footnote omitted).
178 The Draft Articles are non-binding; they purport “to formulate, by way of codification and
progressive development, the basic rules of international law concerning the responsibility of
States.” Draft Articles, supra note 80, at 59. The ICJ has recognized Article 16 as reflecting customary
international law, while the status of Article 41(2) has not been resolved. HELMUT PHILIPP AUST,
COMPLICITY AND THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 3, 343 (2011).
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to avoid becoming instruments, via consent, of a host state’s breach of
international law.
Article 46 of the Vienna Convention provides that consent cannot be
presumed valid when it is given in violation of the consenting state’s laws and
“that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of
fundamental importance.”179 Article 46 further states that “[a] violation is
manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the
matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.”180 The “manifest
and fundamentally important” language also appears in the Draft Articles on
the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations.181 If the intensity threshold has not been
met, it should be “objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the
matter” that force may not be used pursuant to international humanitarian law,
regardless of the host state’s consent.
In such situations, intervening states must avoid aiding the host state in
its attempt to evade its human rights law obligations. Article 16 of the Draft
Articles provides:
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for
doing so if:
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the
internationally wrongful act; and
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.182

The Commentary to the Draft Articles explains that Article 16 applies to
situations in which “a State voluntarily assists or aids another State in carrying
out conduct which violates the international obligations of the latter, for
example, by knowingly providing an essential facility or financing the activity
in question.”183 Article 16 is therefore not directly applicable to consent-based
intervention—it anticipates a situation in which the third-party state plays a
facilitating, rather than active role, and it only applies when the third-party
state could not lawfully take the action itself. Nonetheless, it highlights that
states must refrain from knowingly enabling the breach of another state’s
international law obligations and implies that situations will occur in which
one state has been able to appraise itself of another state’s international
Vienna Convention, supra note 83, art. 46(1).
Id. art. 46(2).
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations with Commentaries art. 46, in Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the
Work of Its Thirty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/37/10 (1982) [hereinafter IO Treaties Commentaries].
182 Draft Articles, supra note 80, art. 16.
183 Id. art. 16 cmt. 1.
179
180
181
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obligations. Commentary to Article 16, for example, points to General
Assembly Resolution 3314, which defines unlawful aggression to include a
situation in which a state “allow[s] its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an
act of aggression against a third State.”184 The Commentary also emphasizes
the unlawfulness of knowingly facilitating human rights violations:
[A] State may incur responsibility if it . . . provides material aid to a State
that uses the aid to commit human rights violations. . . . [T]he particular
circumstances of each case must be carefully examined to determine whether
the aiding State by its aid was aware of and intended to facilitate the
commission of the internationally wrongful conduct.185

Article 41 of the Draft Articles also imposes liability on third-party states
who assist in “serious breaches”:
1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any
serious breach within the meaning of article 40.
2. No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious
breach within the meaning of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in
maintaining that situation.186

Article 41 is more limited in its application than Article 16, but in those
more limited situations, it holds states to a higher standard. While Article 16
applies to any internationally wrongful act, Article 41 applies only to “serious
breach[es] by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of
general international law.”187 These are defined as involving “a gross or
systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil[l] the obligation.”188 What
counts as a peremptory norm is not firmly established, but there is reason to
believe that they are violated by inappropriate uses of force. In Barcelona
Traction, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized prohibitions on
acts of international aggression and genocide, and “principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination.”189 The prohibition against torture190 and the

G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3(f) (Dec. 14, 1974).
Draft Articles, supra note 80, art. 16 cmt. 9.
Id. art. 41(1)–(2).
Id. art. 40(1).
Id. art. 40(2).
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Second Phase) (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970
I.C.J. 3, ¶ 34 (Feb. 5).
190 See AUST, supra note 178, at 36; see also Abass, supra note 78, at 212 (stating that the
prohibition against torture has become a peremptory norm).
184
185
186
187
188
189
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right to self-determination191 also are likely peremptory norms. In the context
of the use of force, it is also likely that the arbitrary deprivation of life violates
a peremptory norm.192 If a peremptory norm is at stake, a state must neither
recognize the situation creating its violation nor assist in its violation. Unlike
Article 16, Article 41 does not ask whether the act would be wrongful if
committed by the assisting state, and it does not contain a “knowing” standard.
Two ICJ advisory opinions clarify the duty of states not to recognize an
unlawful situation. In the Namibia case,193 the ICJ found that U.N. Member
States had an obligation not to enter into treaties with South Africa that
recognized its unlawful claim to its former territory Namibia.194 In the Wall
case, the ICJ explained that states had an obligation “not to recognize the
illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory.”195 Under the nonrecognition standard set by these
cases, states are required to deny legal effect to state actions that are in
violation of jus cogens.196 If states must treat such violations as “null and
void,”197 then by extension states cannot give legal weight to consent to a
serious breach of a peremptory norm.
b. Complying with the Obligation in Practice
States do not have a general obligation to inquire into the validity of
consent as a matter of the consenting state’s domestic law, but they also cannot
be willfully blind to the obvious.198 Violations of jus cogens are per se obvious,
191 See Zaha Hassan, Building Walls and Burning Bridges: Legal Obligations of the United States with
Respect to Israel’s Construction of the Wall of Separation in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 13 WILLAMETTE
J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 197, 200 (2005) (listing self-determination as a right belonging to the
Palestinian people); David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 607, 619 (1995) (stating that self-determination is “embodied in the UN Charter”). The scope
and meaning of the right to self-determination, however, remain ambiguous and contested. For a
discussion of the legal status of self-determination, see Zora Ahmed, Strengthening Standards for
Consent: The Case of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 459, 472-78 (2015).
192 See SHAH, supra note 97, at 86-87 (arguing that drone strikes may violate jus cogens and, as a result,
that consent to such strikes may be void under Article 26 of the Draft Articles and Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention); see also Eliav Lieblich, Quasi-Hostile Acts: The Limits on Forcible Disruption Operations
Under International Law, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 101, 145 (2014) (stating that the right to life is non-derogable).
193 Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (Sw. Africa)
Notwithstanding Sec. Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
194 AUST, supra note 178, at 308-09, 332-33.
195 Legal Consequences of Constr. of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 159 (July 9).
196 See Lea Brilmayer & Isaias Yemane Tesfalidet, Third State Obligations and the Enforcement of
International Law, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 30 (2011) (“In some circumstances, it might be argued,
the actions of a State are so completely contrary to international law as to have no legal effect.”).
197 Id.
198 Deeks proposes a “duty to inquire,” which may be a somewhat higher standard. Deeks, supra
note 7, at 35-38.
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and even in the absence of jus cogens violations, the consent-receiving state
must not willfully ignore facts that suggest the host state’s consent was given
in violation of its international law obligations.
This obligation requires the intervening state to independently and
objectively determine whether the host state is engaged in a NIAC with the
organized non-state actor. Below the intensity threshold, the host state must
comport itself under a law enforcement framework and, by extension, so must
the intervening state. When a NIAC exists, the host state may lawfully
consent to any action that it could itself take under international
humanitarian law. Operating within the lawful bounds of the host state’s
consent, the intervening state may treat members of the organized non-state
group as belligerents. Consider, for example, that the United States has
engaged in drone strikes against non-state actors such as al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula and al-Shabaab. Even if the United States is not engaged
in a NIAC with these groups, the valid consent from Yemen and Somalia,
who are engaged in a NIAC with these non-state actors, allows the United
States to treat members as combatants instead of civilians.199
In summary, the intervening state’s actions are limited by its own human
rights obligations, to the extent that they apply extraterritorially;200 the host
state’s actual consent, to the extent it contains any conditions or limitations;
and the manifest limits on the validity of the host state’s consent given
peremptory norms of international law.
B. Why Closing the Loophole Is “Good Law”
Using the 2016 Oregon standoff as a case study, this Section shows that
recognizing the applicability of the intensity threshold to consent-based
interventions is consistent with common sense and general principles of
international law. Moreover, respecting the threshold does not prevent states
from effectively responding to threats posed by organized non-state actors.

199 See, e.g., Naz K. Modirzadeh, Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the Transformation
of the Law of Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War Governance, 5 HARV.
NAT’L SECURITY J. 225, 281-83, 281 n.129 (2014) (“[T]he U.S. may be operating within a given
territorial state, such as Yemen or Pakistan, with that state’s consent. That consent may take the
form of inviting the U.S. to support that nation in its own preexisting NIAC with a particular
purported branch or associated force of al Qaeda or the Taliban.”); Michael N. Schmitt, Narrowing
the International Law Divide: The Drone Debate Matures, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 6 (2014)
(“Targeting the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban comprises assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan in
their respective NIACs with those groups. Targeting al Qaeda assets is an aspect of a separate NIAC
between the United States and the organization.”).
200 See supra Section II.C.

2016]

Consent Is Not Enough

41

1. The Oregon Standoff: Highlighting the Importance
of the Intensity Threshold in NIACs
On the morning of January 2, 2016, the headquarters of the Malheur
National Wildlife Refuge near Burns, Oregon—a facility managed by the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service—was empty for the holiday weekend.201 By
that afternoon, a group of armed activists, led by brothers Ammon and Ryan
Bundy, had occupied it.202 The activists announced that “they had as many as
100 supporters with them.”203 The Bundy name was familiar to many
Americans: Ammon and Ryan’s father, rancher Cliven Bundy, had been
engaged in a two-decade-long dispute with the federal government over cattle
grazing fees on federal land.204 That dispute had culminated in a standoff in
April 2014, during which news media published pictures of Bundy supporters
with rifle sights locked on federal agents.205
Now, less than two years later, Cliven Bundy’s sons “occupied” a federal
building in protest of federal criminal charges against two other ranchers and
gave no indication that they would desist.206 Indeed, Ammon, Ryan, and their
supporters made clear that they had a specific goal in mind: to “uphold the
Constitution” by securing the relinquishment of the Wildlife Refuge from
federal to local control and by ensuring the release of the imprisoned
ranchers.207 Ammon Bundy indicated that the group “plann[ed] on staying [at
the Refuge] for years” and would be willing to fight and die for its cause.208 At
least one of the occupiers, LaVoy Finicum, crowed that he would rather die
than surrender to the authorities.209 Another, Jon Ritzheimer, had been tracked
by authorities for months preceding the occupation and officially had been
called a “potential threat to law enforcement.”210
While the Oregon occupiers cited localized concerns, there is little doubt
that they represented a broader ideology that questioned the authority of the
201 Stack, supra note 1.
202 Id.
203 Zaitz, supra note 3.
204 Jonathan Allen, After Nevada Ranch Stand-off, Emboldened Militias Ask: Where Next?,
REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2014, 5:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ranchers-nevada-militia-

insight-idUSBREA3G26620140417 [https://perma.cc/9YXY-P5WJ] .
205 See, e.g., id.
206 Zaitz, supra note 3.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Michael E. Miller, LaVoy Finicum, Ore. Occupier Who Said He’d Rather Die than Go to Jail, Did
Just That, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/
01/27/lavoy-finicum-ore-occupier-who-said-hed-rather-die-than-go-to-jail-did-just-that [https://perma.cc/
93C9-WLUW].
210 Peter Holley, The ‘Unhinged’ Oregon Protester that the FBI Has Been Tracking for Months, WASH.
POST (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/01/05/why-a-notoriousanti-islam-radical-turned-on-the-federal-government-in-oregon [https://perma.cc/J2ML-ND5D].
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federal government on myriad issues.211 During the same week that the
occupation began, the Southern Poverty Law Center issued a report identifying
nearly 276 armed militia groups in the United States, a thirty-seven percent
increase from 2012.212 In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security issued
an intelligence assessment expressing concern about the potential rise of
domestic antigovernment terror213 and, several months before the Oregon
standoff, the Department of Justice created a new position—Domestic
Terrorism Counsel—to combat the growing threat.214
The armed Oregon standoff, in which occupiers pledged to die before
being captured and questioned the authority and legitimacy of the federal
government, highlights the importance of an intensity threshold for
establishing the existence of a NIAC. Absent such a threshold, the rhetoric
of the occupiers, the rise of militias, and the growing threat of domestic terror
might have been enough for a government to suggest that it was in a NIAC
with the militia group and to operate accordingly. As a practical matter, this
would have allowed the government to use military force against the
occupiers. If the Wildlife Refuge headquarters were located in an urban area,
the absence of an intensity threshold would have perhaps even allowed the
government to tolerate some civilian casualties as “collateral damage.”
Instead, with the intensity threshold in place, and human rights law
clearly binding below that threshold, the government was legally obligated to
act under different constraints. It was only entitled to use progressive force
as necessary.215 The law enforcement authorities waited, negotiated, and set
traps to arrest the occupiers.216 When the standoff ended several weeks after
the initial occupation, only Finicum had died, allegedly after drawing a
weapon on an FBI agent.217
211 Thomas, supra note 5.
212 Id.; Antigovernment Militia Groups Grew by More than One-Third in Last Year, supra note 6.
213 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, RIGHTWING
EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN
RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT 8 (2009), http://fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf [https://

perma.cc/HGJ4-YF7U].
214 Wesley Bruer, DOJ Pivots from ISIS to U.S. Anti-government Groups with New Position, CNN
(Oct. 15, 2015, 4:49 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/14/politics/justice-department-domesticterror-council [https://perma.cc/8TM9-KFDP].
215 See supra subsection III.A.1.
216 Dave Seminara, Richard Pérez-Peña & Kirk Johnson, Oregon Standoff Ends as Last Militant
Surrenders, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/us/oregon-standoff.html
[https://perma.cc/8R9X-YJVV].
217 Kirk Johnson, Julie Turkewitz & Richard Pérez-Peña, F.B.I. Releases Video Showing Death of
Oregon Refuge Occupier, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/29/us/oregonstandoff.html [https://perma.cc/GP9Q-76Q4]. Ammon and Ryan Bundy were subsequently charged
with and acquitted of federal conspiracy and weapons charges in connection with the Oregon
standoff; as of October 2016, several other protestors involved in the standoff had pled guilty to
federal crimes or were awaiting trial. See Mark Berman, Ammon Bundy Was Acquitted for the Oregon
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This scenario illustrates the value of applying human rights law below the
intensity threshold. Even when organized non-state actors resort to illegal
and violent actions against the government, states must take action pursuant
to their domestic law and their human rights obligations, rather than pursuant
to international humanitarian law, at least before a minimum level of intensity
is reached. The intensity threshold separating ordinary anti-state violence
from a NIAC prevents ordinary civil disturbances from being treated like a
war, preserving civilians’ fundamental human rights.
2. The Canadians Strike: Highlighting the Importance
of the Intensity Threshold in TNIACs
Imagine that President Obama, after determining either that the United
States was unwilling or unable to use military force against the occupiers, called
Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau to request and consent to the Royal Canadian
Air Force taking military action.218 Alternatively, imagine that Canada,
concerned that the insurrection might spread across the border, requested and
received U.S. consent to intervene forcefully. Absent the constraints that we
advocate above, there would be little to prevent Canada from taking action and,
if questioned, leaning on the consent as a legally sufficient justification.
Host state consent, in other words, is not legally sufficient to justify a use
of force. Just as the U.S. government could not have ordered an airstrike against
the armed Oregon occupiers, the United States could not have lawfully consented
to a Canadian bombing raid. Moreover, Canada would be obligated to exercise
self-restraint if it ever received such obviously illegitimate consent.
3. From Fiction to Reality
The thought of a Canadian bombing raid against U.S. citizens seems so
implausible as to be absurd. The United States would never give such permission,
and Canada would never accept it. But there are a number of recent, real-world
interventions that parallel this hypothetical scenario all too closely.
In just the past few years, Russia conducted air strikes against Syrians at
the request of President Bashar al-Assad,219 Saudi and Emirati troops marched
Refuge Takeover. Now He’s Facing Another Federal Trial, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2016, 12:04 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/10/28/ammon-bundy-got-acquitted-forthe-oregon-refuge-takeover-now-hes-facing-another-federal-trial/?utm_term=.d56259e54cc1 [https://
perma.cc/KKE6-JC7T]; Courtney Sherwood & Kirk Johnson, Bundy Brothers Acquitted in Takeover of
Oregon Wildlife Refuge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/us/bundybrothers-acquitted-in-takeover-of-oregon-wildlife-refuge.html [https://perma.cc/R7PH-YY2V].
218 Obviously, this example is offered purely for hypothetical purposes. We do not believe that
anything we describe here would have transpired.
219 Lawmakers Authorize Use of Russian Military Force for Anti-IS Airstrikes in Syria, supra note 9.
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into Bahrain to help put down protests,220 and European countries continue to
press the Libyan government for permission to conduct anti-smuggling naval
operations in their territorial waters.221
EU operations in Libyan waters would not be the first of their kind. In
May 2012, Somalia’s government allowed the European Union’s anti-piracy
force to attack pirate bases on the Somali coast.222 The European forces
engaged in small arms fire from a helicopter in what was “expected to be the
first of many [attacks] along the thousands of miles of Somali coastline.”223
The EU had both Somali consent and authorization from the United Nations
Security Council.224 But, as discussed above, a jus ad bellum justification does
not answer the jus in bello inquiry: Had the conflict with Somali pirates
crossed the intensity threshold? Was the European Union applying human
rights law or international humanitarian law?
Or consider a subset of U.S. targeted killings that some call “side payment
strikes.”225 According to these commentators, the United States sometimes agrees
to target non-state actors involved in conflict with U.S. allies—but not necessarily
with the United States—in exchange for those allies’ permission to enter their
airspace and strike U.S.-selected targets.226 Such arrangements are not necessarily
illegal; U.S. allies can request and consent to U.S. assistance in fighting their
NIACs, and the United States can request and receive permission to enter allies’
sovereign borders to strike non-state actors in a NIAC with the United States. But
some of these side-payment strikes are not far removed, legally speaking, from the
imagined Canadian military strikes on the Bundy brothers.

McEvers, supra note 15.
Curfew Follows Deadly Bahrain Crackdown, supra note 16.
Chris Stephen, British Warship Sent to Libya to Target People-Smugglers, GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2016,
7:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/03/uk-warship-to-tackle-libya-people-smugglers
[https://perma.cc/M3BT-LGEK].
222 Robert Wright & Katrina Manson, EU Raid Targets Somali Pirates Onshore, FIN. TIMES (May 15,
2012), https://www.ft.com/content/b08d9800-9e7f-11e1-a24e-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/RF2G-73QG].
223 Id.
224 S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 2 (Dec. 16, 2008).
225 E.g., MARK DANNER, SPIRAL: TRAPPED IN THE FOREVER WAR 119 (2016) (internal
quotations omitted); Gregory McNeal, How to Make a Kill-List, LAWFARE (Feb. 25, 2013, 7:05 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-make-kill-list [https://perma.cc/5U7Z-GY5T]; Marcy Wheeler, David
Barron and the Other Missing Memos, JUST SECURITY (May 22, 2014, 4:20 PM), https://www.justsecurity.
org/10723/guest-post-david-barron-confirmed-questions-remain [https://perma.cc/H9N8-FX48]; Micah
Zenko, An Inconvenient Truth, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 10, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/10/aninconvenient-truth [https://perma.cc/MB23-Q65E].
226 E.g., John Knefel, Did the CIA’s Drone Program in Pakistan Begin with a ‘Bargaining Chip’
Killing?, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/did-the-ciasdrone-program-in-pakistan-begin-with-a-bargaining-chip-killing-20130408 [https://perma.cc/2EUTEWNE]; Mark Mazzetti, A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret-drone-war-in-pakistan.html
[https://perma.cc/LT62-V45D].
220
220
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C. Effectively Responding to Threats from Organized Non-State Actors
A skeptical reader might wonder why a state, under threat of an attack,
should have to wait to see whether the organized non-state actor’s actions
cross the intensity threshold before taking defensive measures. Have states
completely ceded the power to engage in an armed conflict to non-state
actors? And if so, is this appropriate?
However, this is an inaccurate portrayal of the state’s relationship to an
organized non-state actor. A state need not sit on its hands waiting for the
violence to cross the intensity threshold before taking defensive measures.
Just as international humanitarian law does not provide a state with carte
blanche during armed conflict, neither does human rights law impose
handcuffs. Rather, each legal framework uses differing constraints—the
debate is about how, rather than whether, a state may act.
The Oregon standoff once again illustrates the point. Because the intensity
threshold was not met, as a matter of international law, the U.S. government had
a legal obligation to pursue nonviolent means of resolution before resorting to
force and otherwise take action in accordance with its domestic and human rights
law obligations. The U.S. government still had a wide array of law enforcement
tools at its disposal. The same is true in consent-based interventions. Had the
United States required assistance in its law enforcement against the Bundy
brothers and their followers, it could have invited Canada or another state to assist
it in its law enforcement. That would be true even if the Bundy brothers and their
followers threatened to attack Canada: The United States might utilize its own
criminal law enforcement tools to effect the arrest and trial, or extradition, of the
Bundy brothers. The United States could also consent to a Canadian law
enforcement intervention that comports with human rights law.
Requiring intervening states to act consistent with the host-state’s human
rights obligations when they participate in conflicts below the intensity
threshold ensures that non-state actor members do not lose human rights
protections prematurely. When the Bundy brothers and their followers took
the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, they (presumably) knowingly
subjected themselves to criminal prosecution, but they did not start an armed
conflict and rightly were not treated as if they had. To be sure, a skeptic may
have little sympathy for an insurgent non-state actor and might argue that
allowing Bundy to hold the refuge while law enforcement sought to peacefully
resolve the situation rather than calling in the military put Bundy in the
proverbial driver’s seat. But international human rights law is founded on a
presumption that the state owes its residents—even those who engage in
violence—a variety of human rights protections. They should not be treated
as parties to an armed conflict and lose those protections until the violence
they commit satisfies the longstanding intensity threshold.
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CONCLUSION
Since the Geneva Conventions took effect in 1949, international law has
drawn a sharp line between internal armed conflicts and more ordinary civil
violence. In situations of armed conflict, states are permitted to deploy military
force, governed by the law of armed conflict. In situations of more ordinary civil
violence, by contrast, states are bound to rely instead on the tools of criminal
law enforcement, governed by domestic law and international human rights law,
to address violent threats. The rise of transnational non-international armed
conflicts—in which states use force in territory not their own—has raised a
pressing new question: does the fact that the host state has consented to the use
of force mean that the intervening state may use force in ways that would not
be permitted for the host state itself?
This Article argues that the answer is no. Consent is not enough. Host
states cannot consent to actions that they could not have lawfully undertaken
themselves, and intervening states cannot rely on consent that is given in
manifest violation of a host state’s human rights obligations. Both the host
state and the intervening state have an independent obligation to determine
if a conflict is, indeed, an armed conflict to which the law of armed conflict
applies or, instead, a lower-intensity civil disturbance governed by domestic
law and human rights law.
This approach is consistent with the spirit of international humanitarian law
and international human rights law. If the intensity threshold dividing civil
disturbance from armed conflict did not apply to transnational non-international
armed conflicts, a state could easily evade the law’s protections by outsourcing its
security operations to a less-constrained foreign state. But international human
rights law and international humanitarian law are not meant to be so easily
outwitted, holes in the law’s protections so easily manufactured. Rather, the law
is meant to create a web of safeguards. Both bodies of law are devoted to allowing
states to deploy force against threats to the state and its citizenry, but both require
them to do so in ways that are attentive to basic human rights and humanitarian
values. Some legal protections are most appropriate to situations of more
ordinary governance, others more appropriate to armed conflict. But clever
maneuvers cannot be used to manufacture legal loopholes without violating the
deepest commitments of both bodies of law and thus of the international legal
order as a whole.
The dangers faced today by states are real: Organized non-state actors
pose threats previously unimagined. In the face of these threats, states may
understandably be drawn to seek ways to respond without regard for
restraints imposed by law. But this is a false siren. The organized non-state
groups that engage in violence are dangerous precisely because they reject
state authority and the rules that states together formulated after World War
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II to jointly regulate their behavior. If states invent legal loopholes or exploit
unresolved ones to combat these groups unrestrained by those same laws, they
do the work of the non-state groups for them. These laws are only meaningful
if they are observed even in times of real crisis.
This Article points to a larger truth about international law. The world is
constantly changing: new threats arise, new technologies emerge, and new
patterns of state practice develop. All this change produces potential gaps in
the law, and questions constantly arise as to how those gaps should be
addressed. Should they be treated as legal black holes to which no law applies?
Or when new situations create new legal ambiguities, should academics and
practitioners seek to resolve them in ways that give effect to the deep
commitments of the international legal order? This Article argues that efforts
to address the potential legal gaps must reinforce, not erode, the foundational
tenants of international law. Here, in the case of consent-based interventions,
ignoring the distinction between civil unrest and armed conflict would
undermine the principle that force should be used as a last resort. Requiring
states to respect the intensity threshold in transnational conflicts is essential
not only to protecting the people caught in the midst of such conflicts, but
also to defending the deepest commitments of the international legal order.

*

*

*

*

*

